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CONTRACTS EX MACHINA 
KEVIN WERBACH† & NICOLAS CORNELL†† 
ABSTRACT 
  Smart contracts are self-executing digital transactions using 
decentralized cryptographic mechanisms for enforcement. They were 
theorized more than twenty years ago, but the recent development of 
Bitcoin and blockchain technologies has rekindled excitement about 
their potential among technologists and industry. Startup companies 
and major enterprises alike are now developing smart contract 
solutions for an array of markets, purporting to offer a digital bypass 
around traditional contract law. For legal scholars, smart contracts 
pose a significant question: Do smart contracts offer a superior solution 
to the problems that contract law addresses? In this article, we aim to 
understand both the potential and the limitations of smart contracts. We 
conclude that smart contracts offer novel possibilities, may significantly 
alter the commercial world, and will demand new legal responses. But 
smart contracts will not displace contract law. Understanding why not 
brings into focus the essential role of contract law as a remedial 
institution. In this way, smart contracts actually illuminate the role of 
contract law more than they obviate it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Technological advancements hold the potential to alter our very 
conception of the law. It is already common to suggest that 
technologies can operate as a kind of law, regulating the behavior of 
users.1 But, thus far, traditional legal enforcement has generally 
remained available as a backstop. Is it possible for emerging 
technologies to displace the law even for enforcement, law’s 
historically essential province? In this Article, we examine a significant 
contemporary example, digitally enforced “smart contracts”2 based on 
the distributed cryptocurrency technology of Bitcoin3 and the 
 
 1. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) 
(arguing that “code is law”). This recognition in the legal academy of the constitutive role of 
technology follows a broader understanding within science and technology studies. See generally 
JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012) (arguing that legal and technical rules governing flows of 
information are out of balance); Bruno Latour, On Technical Mediation–Philosophy, Sociology, 
Genealogy, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 29 (1994) (analyzing the role of technological artifacts in 
modern day culture). 
 2. A smart contract is an agreement in digital form that is self-executing and self-enforcing. 
See infra note 24 and accompanying text. The term was coined by cryptographer Nick Szabo in 
the 1990s. See Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST 
MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.cc/ 
53HK-9D6W]. 
 3. Bitcoin is a digital currency not issued by any bank or sovereign state. Bitcoin first 
appeared in a paper published online in 2008 by “Satoshi Nakamoto.” See Satoshi Nakamoto, 
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
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blockchain that facilitates it.4 Enthusiasts of various stripes believe that 
smart contracts offer the potential to displace the legal system’s core 
function of enforcing agreements.5 
It has traditionally been assumed that enforceable agreements—
the lifeblood of the modern economic and social world—require the 
backing of a legal system. Nearly four centuries ago, Thomas Hobbes 
described the impossibility of binding agreements without the law: 
  If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform 
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature 
(which is a condition of war of every man against every man,) upon 
any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power 
set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel 
performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first, has no 
assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words 
are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other 
passions, without the fear of some coercive power . . . . 
  But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those 
that would otherwise violate their faith . . . he which by the covenant 
is to perform first, is obliged so to do.6 
Hobbes’s basic idea—that binding agreements require a system to 
ensure that counterparties can trust one another to perform—is an 
 
bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/B777-M9F5]. Cryptocurrency is the more general term 
for currency-like tokens, like Bitcoin, that are secured through cryptography rather than 
traditional means. 
 4. A blockchain is a distributed ledger of transactions like the one created for Bitcoin. See 
id. (“We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures.”). Every node in a blockchain 
network verifiably sees the same transaction record, even though there is no master copy. Bitcoin 
uses this platform for a currency, with the ledger guaranteeing that the same coin cannot be spent 
twice. Smart contracts use blockchains to generalize the approach to any digitally expressible 
transaction.  
 5. See Matt Byrne, Do Lawyers Have a Future?, LAW. (Sept. 20, 2016), https:// 
www.thelawyer.com/issues/online-september-2016/do-lawyers-have-a-future-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
H2P4-BC94] (“Numerous futurists predict that smart contracts, using the developing technologies 
of blockchain and less strict coding languages, will result in contracts being written as immutable 
code on private blockchains, humming along harmoniously and self-executing and self-
regulating.”); Alan Cunningham, Decentralisation, Distrust & Fear of the Body–The Worrying 
Rise of Crypto-Law, SCRIPTED 237 (Dec. 2016), https://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/
12/13-3-cunningham.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAP2-VWVA] (“It is suggested that that the use of a 
blockchain . . . will guarantee the enforceability element of such transactions, without any need 
for . . . trust in the law as a reliable social praxis.”). 
 6. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651). See generally 
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985) 
(examining the possibilities for assurance without state-imposed enforcement). 
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intuitive and powerful argument for the essential role of the law.7 
Yet recent technological advances have led to speculation that 
smart contracts might largely, or entirely, displace the apparatus of 
contract law.8 As one commentator succinctly puts this radical claim, 
“[s]mart contracts don’t [need] a legal system to exist: they may 
operate without any overarching legal framework. De facto, they 
represent a technological alternative to the whole legal system.”9 
Mainstream legal trade journals wonder whether “innovations offered 
by the Bitcoin 2.0 generation of technology may create a world where 
. . . technology renders some contract causes of action obsolete.”10 
Even world leaders have taken notice, like Russian Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev, who declared that “[s]mart [c]ontracts represent [a] 
new challenge to legal regulation. Systems creating such contracts live 
by their own rules, beyond the boundaries of law.”11 In short, smart 
contracts may offer the hope—or possibly the threat—of 
circumventing Hobbes’s age-old essential role for the law. 
The reaction to these new possibilities runs the gamut, from 
gleeful triumph to killjoy skepticism. Supporters claim smart contracts 
 
 7. Cf. Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1391, 1418 (2006) (“Private enforcement is not merely inconvenient: it is inconsistent with justice 
because it is ultimately the rule of the stronger.”). 
 8. See DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE 
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 47 (2016) 
(“Smart contracts are unprecedented methods of ensuring contractual compliance, including 
social contracts.”); Byrne, supra note 5; Cunningham, supra note 5, at 254; Rob Marvin, 
Blockchain in 2017: The Year of Smart Contracts, PCMAG (Dec. 12, 2016), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article/350088/blockchain-in-2017-the-year-of-smart-contracts [https:// 
perma.cc/2K96-PVVR] (quoting Jeff Garzik, Linux Board member, as saying that smart contracts 
will offer “adjudication-as-a-service,” which will be “a hyper real-time version of the court 
system”).  
 9. Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts as the Beginning of the End of 
Classic Contract Law 21 (Nat’l Research Univ. Higher Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. BRP 
71/LAW/2016, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885241 [https:// 
perma.cc/HS7F-PF3W].  
 10. Andrew Hinkes, Blockchains, Smart Contracts, and the Death of Specific Performance, 
INSIDE COUNSEL (July 29, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/07/29/blockchains-smart-
contracts-and-the-death-of-speci [https://perma.cc/6FSQ-TT47]; see also Byrne, supra note 5 
(“Numerous futurist predict that smart contracts, using the developing technologies of blockchain 
and less strict coding languages will result in contracts being written as immutable code on private 
blockchains, humming along harmoniously and self-executing and self-regulating. All of a sudden, 
the disruption we have seen in other sectors is knocking at our own doors. But, we need not panic. 
At least, not yet.”). 
 11. Savelyev, supra note 9, at 15 (citing Dmitry Medvedev, Vystupleniye Dmitriya 
Medvedeva na plenarnom zasedanii [Speech of Dmitry Medvedev on Plenary Session], Saint 
Petersburg International Legal Forum (May 18, 2016)). 
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will obviate the need for contract law, revolutionize business 
arrangements, and restructure property ownership.12 Skeptics see the 
blockchain foundation as little more than a Ponzi scheme.13 Some 
technologists argue that, despite their name, smart contracts have 
nothing to do with contracts.14 One group conspicuously absent from 
the debate over smart contracts is contract law scholars. 
Upon inspection, the story is complex. Smart contracts may or 
may not transform the world, but they provide real benefits and seem 
likely to enjoy significant adoption over time. They represent the 
mature end of the evolution of electronic agreements over several 
decades.15 Firms can achieve significant cost savings and efficiency 
gains when using computers to automate contracting.16 Smart contracts 
 
 12. See, e.g., ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY 
TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2016) (“Optimists claim that Bitcoin will fundamentally alter payments, 
economics, and even politics around the world.”); NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, CAN SMART 
CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACTS? 2 (2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ 
knowledge/publications/ 144559/can-smart-contracts-be-legally-binding-contracts [https://perma.
cc/SKV7-Z8P8] (quoting R3 consortium CEO David Rutter stating that “smart contracts . . . will 
set the scene for the next twenty years of finance”); Not-So-Clever Contracts, ECONOMIST  
(July 30, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-
judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted [https://perma.cc/E6WR-TKLH] (“Such ‘smart contracts’ 
are all the rage among futurist backers of the blockchain, the technology that underpins bitcoin, 
a digital currency.”). 
 13. A Ponzi scheme is a form of investment fraud in which earlier investors are paid returns 
out of funds contributed by new investors, rather than from actual profits. See Fast Answers: Ponzi 
Schemes, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersponzihtm.html [https://perma.cc/BFB6-4T8C]. Critics argue that the value of 
Bitcoin depends on a steady stream of new purchasers willing to buy the digital currency at higher 
prices, even though earlier purchasers (seeking investment returns) do not actually use it to buy 
anything, eventually causing a collapse. See Matt O’Brien, Bitcoin Isn’t the Future of Money—It’s 
Either a Ponzi Scheme or a Pyramid Scheme, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/06/08/bitcoin-isnt-the-future-of-
money-its-either-a-ponzi-scheme-or-a-pyramid-scheme/ [https://perma.cc/7BRH-Y7VE]; Eric 
Posner, Fool’s Gold, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:11 AM) http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/04/bitcoin_is_a_ponzi_scheme_the_internet_curren
cy_will_collapse.html [https://perma.cc/NQ8R-77ZB]; see also Ferdinando Ametrano, Why 2017 
Will Prove ‘Blockchain’ Was a Bad Idea, COINDESK (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/ 
2017-will-prove-blockchain-bad-idea [https://perma.cc/4HCX-PGX9] (“Probably some smart 
contract hype will clutter the debate, thanks to the smartest ones among the fools trying to 
outsmart even the smart contract inventor.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Explainer: Smart Contracts, MONAX, https://monax.io/explainers/ 
smart_contracts [https://perma.cc/45AT-KUEF] (“To begin with, smart contracts are neither 
particularly smart nor are they, strictly speaking, contracts.”). 
 15. See generally Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629 (2012) 
(describing the development of data-oriented and computable digital contracts). 
 16. See, e.g., JAMES SCHNEIDER ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, BLOCKCHAIN: PUTTING 
THEORY INTO PRACTICE (2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/313839001/Profiles-in-Innovation-
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could greatly extend those benefits, by taking advantage of Bitcoin and 
the blockchain as open platforms for secure exchange of value without 
mutual trust.17 As they are adopted, or used in lieu of traditional 
contracting, smart contracts will force courts, legislatures, and other 
legal actors to confront difficult questions about the application of 
basic contract doctrines. 
They will not, however, replace contract law. While smart 
contracts can meet the doctrinal requirements of contract law,18 they 
serve a fundamentally different purpose. Contract law is a remedial 
institution. Its aim is not to ensure performance ex ante, but to 
adjudicate the grievances that may arise ex post.19 Smart contracts 
bring this core function of contract law into sharper relief, as they 
eliminate the act of remediation by admitting no possibility of breach.20 
But, the needs that gave rise to contract law do not disappear. If the 
parties do not or cannot represent all possible outcomes of the smart 
contract arrangement ex ante, the results may diverge from their 
mutual intent. The parties’ expression may also not produce legally 
sanctioned outcomes, as in the case of duress, unconscionability, or 
illegality. Promise-oriented disputes and grievances will not disappear, 
but their complexions will shift. In such scenarios, either the parties or 
the state will seek to reintroduce the machinery of contractual 
adjudication. Once one properly appreciates what is—and what is 
not—the function of contract law, it becomes evident that the reports 
of its death are “greatly exaggerated.”21 
 
May-24-2016-1https://www.scribd.com/doc/313839001/Profiles-in-Innovation-May-24-2016-1 
[https://perma.cc/WP5P-JPZF] (identifying several ways to use blockchain-based smart contracts 
which could save billions of dollars per year). 
 17. See generally Kevin Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (conceptualizing the blockchain as a new architecture 
for trust).  
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor 
to perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”); 
Nicolas Cornell, A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2016) (“[C]ontract law provides a legal remedy to those who have 
complaints arising out of broken agreements. It is purely retrospective; it concerns the relations 
that occur once something impermissible is done.”). 
 20. See Hinkes, supra note 10. 
 21. Though now part of popular culture, the familiar turn of phrase attributed to Mark Twain 
appears to be a slight misquotation. Twain’s original comment was “the report of my death was 
an exaggeration.” SHELLEY FISHER FISHKIN, LIGHTING OUT FOR THE TERRITORY: 
REFLECTIONS ON MARK TWAIN AND AMERICAN CULTURE 134 (1996). 
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The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows. In Part I, we 
describe the history and operation of smart contracts. In Part II, we 
evaluate smart contracts, which have been undertheorized so far, by 
asking how existing legal categories might apply to smart contracts. In 
Part III, we consider whether smart contracts can serve as a substitute 
for contract law. We answer this question in the negative, by analyzing 
the larger question of what contract law is for. In Part IV, we consider 
likely responses to the practical and doctrinal questions we raise. 
Surprisingly for the libertarian proponents of smart contracts, they may 
force the expansion of public law into the private law preserve of 
contracts.22 The only way to prevent serious negative outcomes from 
smart contracts may be for governments to regulate them. 
I.  CONTRACTS GET SMART 
The cryptographer Nick Szabo defined a smart contract as “a set 
of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which 
the parties perform on these promises.”23 By using “a set of promises,” 
Szabo left open whether a smart contract was enforceable as a legal 
contract.24 We consider this question below.25 Szabo’s reference to 
“protocols within which” parties perform is similarly coy. Smart 
contracts do not just specify these protocols; they actually implement 
them. Szabo’s definition has not been universally adopted, and 
subsequent authors offer subtly varied descriptions of the term. For 
 
 22. See, e.g., Aaron Wright & Primavera de Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology 
and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 4 (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664 [https://perma.cc/RQR3-VJCZ] 
(suggesting that “[i]f blockchain technology becomes more widely adopted, centralized 
authorities, such as governmental agencies and large multinational corporations, may lose the 
ability to control and shape the activities of disparate people through existing means”). 
 23. Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, U. AMSTERDAM 
(1996), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOT
winterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html [https://perma.cc/YC35-2MXQ]. 
Max Raskin uses a simpler definition: “agreements wherein execution is automated, usually by 
computers.” Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 
306 (2017); see also Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK (June 4, 
2016, 6:39 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/533S-
JUAJ] (“Many debates about the nature of smart contracts are really just contests between 
competing terminology.”).  
 24. Other authors on the topic include the word “contract” in their definitions. For example, 
Wright and de Filippi define smart contracts as “digital, computable contracts where the 
performance and enforcement of contractual conditions occur automatically, without the need 
for human intervention.” See Wright & de Filippi, supra note 22, at 10–11. 
 25. See infra Part II.A. 
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purposes of this Article, we define a smart contract as an agreement in 
digital form that is self-executing and self-enforcing.26  
In this Part, we examine the history and workings of smart 
contracts. Smart contracts represent the fusion of two lines of 
technological development: electronic contracting and cryptography. 
Smart contracts were first theorized and named two decades ago, but 
significant interest in, and implementation of, smart contracts has 
occurred only recently. Smart contracts could represent merely the 
latest step the evolution of electronic agreements, or, smart contracts’ 
use of blockchain technology could distinguish them from any of their 
antecedents. 
A. The Evolution of Digital Agreements 
Thanks to their speed and power, computers have taken over 
many forms of human interaction over the past half century. Email and 
instant messages substitute for letters and phone calls, accountants use 
spreadsheets and enterprise resource planning software rather than 
paper ledgers, and travelers use online ticketing systems rather than 
going to a travel agent—to give just a handful of examples. This 
automation has had major impacts on employment, the conduct of 
business, and social interactions. In many cases, it has raised significant 
legal and policy questions. The realm of contracting has not been 
immune. 
Contractual agreements embodied in software code, and even 
their automatic performance, are nothing new.27 For several decades, 
larger corporations have used electronic data interchange (EDI) 
formats to communicate digitally across supply chains.28 The internet 
brought electronic commerce (e-commerce) to ordinary consumers, 
who accede to a digital contract every time they begin a relationship 
with an online service provider by clicking a button.29 Despite its digital 
 
 26. In addition to execution and enforcement, smart contract–related technologies could 
support the full range of contractual activity, including precontractual negotiation, contract 
formation, and postcontractual modification. See, e.g., OPENLAW, http://openlaw.io 
[https://perma.cc/D8EZ-D5PW] (offering tools to “[c]reate, store, and execute legal agreements 
that interact with blockchain-based smart contracts.”). We explain the centrality of enforcement 
to smart contracts below at Part I.C. 
 27. See Surden, supra note 15, at 634. 
 28. EDI, which has been around since the 1970s, refers generally to automated digital 
communications between or within firms, much of which goes beyond the bounds of contracting 
language. See JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 5-09 
(4th ed. 2001) (describing EDI); Surden, supra note 15, at 639 n.30. 
 29. See Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Engineering Humans with Contracts 8 (Benjamin 
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costume, this sort of electronic contract is still a written agreement—
while it is electronic in form, its substance and execution are still 
dependent on humans. A user who clicks the hyperlink to read the 
terms of service for Facebook or Amazon.com would then see a 
document that spells out the contractual terms. Courts apply contract 
law to such agreements in the same way as to a paper document. The 
major doctrinal question raised here is acceptance, because most 
consumers barely realize the existence of, let alone read, the 
contractual text; that said, courts have little difficulty disposing of this 
objection.30 
The step beyond an electronic contract is what Professor Harry 
Surden labels a “data-oriented” contract. In these contracts, “the 
parties have expressed one or more terms or conditions of their 
agreement in a manner designed to be processable by a computer 
system.”31 The distinction here is that the primary audience for the 
contract is a machine rather than a human.32 For example, a financial 
option contract may grant the right to purchase a stock at a given price, 
and expire on a certain date. A data-oriented contract would represent 
that arrangement in computer code. A brokerage house could then, if 
the conditions are met, direct its computer system to transfer the 
security to the buyer’s account and debit the correct sum. 
The next stage in Surden’s typology is a “computable” contract.33 
It gives the computer systems that implement data-oriented contracts 
the power “to make automated, prima-facie assessments about 
compliance or performance.”34 In the option contract example above, 
 
N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Faculty Research Paper No. 493, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2834011 [https://perma.cc/VEE3-BU99]. 
 30. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996). Courts have been willing to find the requisite 
evidence of acceptance lacking based on particular facts. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 31. Surden, supra note 15, at 639. 
 32. In fact, the term is even more limited. See id. at 640 (“The data-oriented label simply 
suggests that the parties have decided that some subset of key terms or conditions would benefit 
from being represented as computer processable data.” (emphasis in original)). 
 33. Professor Lauren Henry Scholz applies a different typology of “algorithmic” contracts, 
defined as those “that contain terms that were determined by algorithm rather than a person.” 
Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747701 [https://perma.cc/64Z5-NNRD]. Scholz’s 
focus is on formation. We believe the degree to which execution and enforcement are automated 
is the critical variable for thinking about smart contracts, with algorithmic formation raising its 
own set of issues.  
 34. See Surden, supra note 15, at 636. 
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the brokerage house computer system itself could evaluate whether the 
price and timing of a proposed purchase met the terms of the option. 
The requirements for a computable contract are that the semantics—
the meaning of the contractual terms—can be expressed through a set 
of instructions or logic that a computer can process, and that any data 
necessary for that computation are available in digital form.35 Giving 
machines the ability to determine whether a contract has been 
performed can dramatically reduce transaction costs.36 Although there 
are significant challenges in accurately representing and interpreting 
contractual semantics in computer form, finance and similar fields 
employ computable contracts widely.37 
The evolution from electronic, to data-oriented, to computable 
contracts embodies a trend toward greater machine autonomy. As 
computers can increasingly replace humans in negotiating, forming, 
performing, and enforcing contracts, contracts can increasingly operate 
with the speed and consistency of machines. Further, computable 
contracts can enable machines to contract automatically with one 
another, although such autonomous operation is still relatively 
limited.38 
The limitation of computable contracts is that the computers 
involved can only make prima facie determinations about 
performance.39 The legal system and other traditional mechanisms 
remain available to the parties if they are unsatisfied with the results of 
automated systems.40 The contract is designed to be computable, but if 
the computation diverges from the parties’ intent, as conventionally 
understood in contract law, they may disregard the computerized 
 
 35. See id. at 664. 
 36. See id. at 689–95. 
 37. See id. at 634. 
 38. See id. at 695. 
 39. See id. at 637 n.25. 
 40. Surden’s article, which appeared in 2012, makes no reference to smart contracts or the 
blockchain. More recently, Flood and Goodenough show formally that financial contracts can be 
represented as finite-state machines, which are subject to computational interpretation. See Mark 
D. Flood & Oliver R. Goodenough, Contract as Automaton: The Computational Representation 
of Financial Agreements passim (Office of Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 15-04, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538224 [https://perma.cc/9ZJF-9AT9]. However, Flood and 
Goodenough similarly fail to discuss the implications of implementing these formalized 
agreements as smart contracts. Id.; see also Cristian Prisacariu & Gerardo Schneider, A Formal 
Language for Electronic Contracts, in FORMAL METHODS FOR OPEN OBJECT-BASED 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 174–89 (Marcello M. Bonsangue & Einar Broch Johnsen eds., 2007) 
(proposing a formal language for writing electronic contracts). 
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result.41 
In 1996, Szabo began to publish a series of articles and blog posts 
outlining the functions and technical requirements for what he labeled 
“smart contracts.”42 Szabo’s starting point was that “protocols, running 
on public networks such as the Internet, both challenge and enable us 
to formalize and secure new kinds of relationships in this new 
environment, just as contract law, business forms, and accounting 
controls have long formalized and secured business relationships in the 
paper-based world.”43 He suggested that “[t]he contractual phases of 
search, negotiation, commitment, performance, and adjudication . . . 
can be embedded in [] hardware and software.”44 Many of those 
functions were already being implemented electronically at the time, 
or would be soon with the rise of e-commerce.45 The visionary aspect 
of Szabo’s concept was that hardware and software alone would handle 
the full lifecycle of contractual activity. Human action could be 
completely replaced in various parts of contractual exchange. 
Szabo’s smart contracts did not require fancy technology. His 
primary example was the humble vending machine.46 The simple 
electronic mechanism of a vending machine performs two critical 
functions. First, it directly effectuates performance by taking in money 
and dispending products. Second, it incorporates enough security to 
make the cost of breach (breaking into the machine) exceed the 
potential rewards.47 For all practical purposes, the vending machine is 
 
 41. In some circumstances, those harmed by failures of computerized agreements may 
ultimately be held responsible for their mistake. See, e.g., David Z. Morris, Computer Error Costs 
T. Rowe Price $190 Million in Dell Buyout Settlement, FORTUNE (June 4, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/06/04/computer-error-t-rowe-price-dell/ [https://perma.cc/H3UZ-ZBSQ] 
(noting that T. Rowe Price was not entitled to settlement proceeds because a computerized 
system mistakenly voted its shares in favor of an acquisition that the firm publicly opposed). In 
such situations, however, the aggrieved party is still entitled to its day in court. 
 42. See Szabo, supra note 2; Szabo, supra note 23; Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts 
(1997), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOT 
winterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html [https://perma.cc/XF47-62RC]; 
Nicholas J. Szabo, Presentation for Keynote Address at the IEEE International Workshop on 
Electronic Contracting: Smart Contracts (July 6, 2004), http://w-uh.com/download/ WECSmart 
Contracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HQU-EYR5]. The exact introduction date of the concept is 
uncertain; Szabo stated that he had been refining the idea of smart contracts since “the early 
1990s.” Szabo, supra note 2, at n.1. 
 43. Szabo, supra note 2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 28 (discussing EDI systems that firms have used since 
the 1970s to automate contractual transactions and other communications). 
 46. See Szabo, supra note 2. 
 47. See id. 
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the entire contractual environment for its transactions. It is not limited 
to the prima facie decisions of Surden’s computable contracts, because 
its performance of the contract is effectively final.48 
Szabo’s vision, the full automation of forming and performing 
contracts, was ahead of its time. His work, and similar ideas by others, 
were recognized within the community of “cypherpunks” who design 
technical mechanisms to ensure security and privacy without reliance 
on governments.49 However, these ideas remained largely isolated 
from the e-commerce world.50 
B. Bitcoin and the Blockchain 
The development that made Szabo’s vision of smart contracts 
more than a mere curiosity was Bitcoin, a digital currency not reliant 
on governments, banks, or other intermediary institutions.51 Since it 
appeared in a mysterious 2008 post by the pseudonymous Satoshi 
Nakamoto,52 Bitcoin has provoked intense interest. Less than a decade 
after publication of Nakamoto’s paper, Bitcoin has spawned an entire 
ecosystem of developers, entrepreneurs, investors, traders, and 
analysts, working toward a vision of technologically enabled economic 
and social transformation.53 Over one hundred thousand firms, 
including major companies such as Microsoft, Dell Computer, Dish 
Network, Time Inc., and Overstock.com, accept Bitcoin-denominated 
transactions,54 and the nominal value of Bitcoins in circulation 
 
 48. If the vending machine fails to perform the contract, such as when the product becomes 
stuck and is not dispensed to the customer, a remedy outside the machine may be available. 
 49. See Nathaniel Popper, Decoding the Enigma of Satoshi Nakamoto and the Birth of 
Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/business/decoding-the-
enigma-of-satoshi-nakamoto-and-the-birth-of-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/G4UE-QU4L]; 
Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/7XAK-A8GY]. 
 50. See Wright & de Filippi, supra note 22, at 10 (“[Blockchain] technology has breathed life 
into a theoretical concept [of smart contracts that Szabo] first formulated in 1997.”). 
 51. As described below in this Section, Bitcoin is technically a specific implementation of 
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, or more precisely, the currency token associated with that 
implementation. Smart contracts, the focus of this Article, may be implemented on the Bitcoin 
blockchain or other blockchains.  
 52. See Nakamoto, supra note 3. The identity of the person or persons who authored the 
paper remains unknown. See Popper, supra note 49. 
 53. See generally NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY (2015) (surveying the 
burgeoning Bitcoin community). 
 54. See State of Bitcoin 2015: Ecosystem Grows Despite Price Decline, COINDESK (Jan. 7, 
2015), http://www.coindesk.com/state-bitcoin-2015-ecosystem-grows-despite-price-decline [https: 
//perma.cc/KYV3-7S8J]. 
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exceeded $110 billion in early November 2017.55 Venture capitalists 
have funded scores of Bitcoin-based startups, investing over $1 billion 
so far.56 Most of the world’s largest financial services firms are 
exploring or implementing related technologies. Legal scholars are 
beginning to take notice as well.57 
The core attribute of Bitcoin is that it allows unrelated individuals 
and organizations to have confidence in transactions without trusting 
intermediaries or a legal system.58 A currency requires trust because 
buyers and sellers must believe that the tokens they exchange for assets 
of value will themselves have value. A one hundred dollar bill without 
the “full faith and credit” of the United States of America is just a piece 
of paper featuring a green portrait of Benjamin Franklin. Bitcoin 
supplies a mechanism of trust that does not require the backing of any 
trusted institution or government. And that same mechanism can be 
employed for other kinds of transactions. 
To supply this mechanism, Bitcoin uses a technology called 
“distributed ledgers.”59 A distributed ledger allows any number of 
computers to keep an identical record of information, without 
reference to a central master copy—indeed, no master copy exists.60 
This allows Bitcoin users to be confident that the same user cannot 
spend the same digital coin multiple times, but that turns out to be just 
one of many ways to use distributed ledgers. Developers and 
 
 55. See Market Capitalization, BLOCKCHAIN (2017), https://blockchain.info/charts/market-
cap [https://perma.cc/63GA-DENX].  
 56. See Garrick Hileman, State of Blockchain Q1 2016: Blockchain Funding Overtakes 
Bitcoin, COINDESK (May 11, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-blockchain-q1-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/6K7J-D5S8]. 
 57. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015) 
(discussing “smart property” built on the foundation of smart contracts); Raskin, supra note 23 
(evaluating smart contracts as a form of contractual self-help); Wright & de Filippi, supra note 22 
(considering the implications of the blockchain and smart contracts as a new kind of law). 
 58. Pete Rizzo, VC Fred Wilson: Block Chain Could Be Bigger Opportunity than  
Bitcoin, COINDESK (May 5, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/vc-fred-wilson-block-chain-bigger-
opportunity-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/AW62-C74H]; Rob Wile, Satoshi’s Revolution: How the 
Creator of Bitcoin May Have Stumbled onto Something Much, Much Bigger, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 
22, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-the-blockchain-2014-4 [https://perma.cc/ 
9KFD-4XP2]. 
 59. Strictly speaking, not all distributed ledgers aggregate transactions into chains of blocks. 
However, “the blockchain” is commonly used to describe all similar systems. 
 60. See Hal Hodson, Bitcoin Moves Beyond Mere Money, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24620-bitcoin-moves-beyond-mere-money.html#.VZmD
mqa-uf4 [https://perma.cc/MUX8-S7M2]; Blockchain: The Next Big Thing–Or Is It?, ECONOMIST 
(May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21650295-or-it-next-big-thing 
[https://perma.cc/JZ29-CTF5]. 
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entrepreneurs are actively working on applying this technology to 
cloud file storage;61 ridesharing;62 name registration (as for the 
internet’s Domain Name System);63 crowdfunding;64 device 
management for the Internet of Things;65 online voting;66 verification 
of ownership and time-stamping for digital documents;67 prediction 
markets;68 and even establishing the provenance of wine.69 
There are three primary elements to the Bitcoin architecture: the 
ledger, the network, and consensus. These three elements combine to 
create a mechanism for ensuring trustworthiness without requiring 
trust in any particular institution or agent.70 That means users can have 
confidence that a transaction on the network is legitimate, accurate, 
and not duplicated. 
The first element, the distributed ledger of transactions, is 
commonly called the blockchain.71 This database grows as it steadily 
incorporates new approved transactions. A Bitcoin transaction is a 
cryptographically signed72 statement on the blockchain transferring 
 
 61. See, e.g., MAIDSAFE, http://maidsafe.net [https://perma.cc/VYK3-GZ6L]; STORJ, 
http://storj.io/ [https://perma.cc/AT8D-68UM]. 
 62. See Amanda Johnson, La’Zooz: The Decentralized Proof-of-Movement “Uber” 
Unveiled, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 19, 2014), http://cointelegraph.com/news/112758/lazooz-the-
decentralized-proof-of-movement-uber-unveiled [https://perma.cc/8HRX-DUYP]. 
 63. See, e.g., NAMECOIN, https://namecoin.info [https://perma.cc/SE6M-AEAX]. 
 64. See, e.g., BLOCKTRUST, https://blocktrust.org [https://perma.cc/5NGX-HMWS]. 
 65. See Paul Brody & Veena Pureswaran, Device Democracy : Saving the Future of the 
Internet of Things, IBM passim (2015), http://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/gb/en/ 
gbe03620usen/GBE03620USEN.PDF [https://perma.cc/XC4G-3ZFF ]. 
 66. See Danny Bradbury, How Block Chain Technology Could Usher in Digital Democracy, 
COINDESK (June 16, 2014, 11:05 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/block-chain-technology-digital-
democracy [https://perma.cc/X4RL-CTJM]. 
 67. What is Proof of Existence?, PROOF OF EXISTENCE, http://www.proofofexistence.com/ 
about [https://perma.cc/ZF9Q-TWUZ]. 
 68. Jack Peterson & Joseph Krug, Augur: A Decentralized, Open-Source Platform for 
Prediction Markets passim (2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://bravenewcoin.com/assets/ 
Whitepapers/Augur-A-Decentralized-Open-Source-Platform-for-Prediction-Markets.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XV6G-GM3W]. 
 69. The Future of Wine Provenance Is Bitcoin, VINFOLIO BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014), http:// 
blog.vinfolio.com/2014/10/06/the-future-of-wine-provenance-is-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/W4BX-
82P7]. 
 70. See generally Werbach, supra note 17 (describing the “trustless trust” architecture). 
 71. See Fairfield, supra note 57, at 808. 
 72. A cryptographic signature is a secure means of verifying authenticity. It verifies that the 
transaction was authorized by the possessor of a private key, without actually distributing the key. 
With this approach, Bitcoin transactions can be quasi-anonymous. They are associated with a 
particular account, so it is often possible to correlate multiple transactions with the same account 
holder, but no identifying information about the account holder needs to be provided on the 
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Bitcoin tokens between two or more cryptographic private keys. These 
transactions are grouped together into blocks, with a new block 
appended approximately every ten minutes.73 Every block contains an 
abbreviated reference, called a cryptographic hash, to the block before 
it, which keeps the blocks in the proper order. Anyone can view a 
Bitcoin’s blockchain, and trace back transactions all the way to the 
original “genesis block” created by Nakamoto.74 In theory, no one can 
alter an existing transaction, because every block is linked in an 
immutable sequence.75  
The second element is the network. The blockchain is not stored 
in one central location.76 Instead, computer nodes running the Bitcoin 
software connect in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, where each 
maintains a complete copy of the blockchain. Every transaction is 
broadcast across the network to all nodes, which then add valid blocks 
to the blockchain on a regular basis.77 Individual consumers do not 
need to operate a full node; they can use third-party wallet services to 
host their Bitcoins and connect to a service provider on the Bitcoin 
network.78 
The final element, consensus, is perhaps the least intuitive aspect 
of Bitcoin,79 but perhaps its most significant innovation. Decentralized 
trust systems are difficult because participants to a transaction may be 
untrustworthy, and without the involvement of a trusted central 
institution like a bank, parties face increased risk that the other will not 
comply with the agreement. Especially when there is a financial 
incentive to cheat or lie, some actors can be expected to do so. If there 
 
blockchain. And therefore, unlike traditional financial transactions where the parties may not 
know identities but some intermediaries, like banks, do, the actual identity of those transacting 
may be effectively impossible to determine. 
 73. J. DAX HANSEN, JACOB FARBER & PATRICK MURCK, PERKINS COIE LLP, BITCOIN: A 
PRIMER 2–4, https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/1/4/v2/14394/Bitcoin-Primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6AWT-Z6T2]. Some distributed ledger systems use data structures other than 
blockchains, but the basic approach is similar.  
 74. Making the ledger public enhances trust because no one can hide or lie about the status 
of any transaction. Permissioned blockchains, which are limited to identified users, do not 
necessarily offer the global visibility of Bitcoin. See infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
 75. The technical meaning of immutability for a blockchain is actually somewhat complex. 
See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 713, 734–45 (2017). 
 76. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 8. 
 77. See id., at 53; Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 78. Individuals wanting complete independence from any intermediary can, however, still 
operate their own full node on the network. 
 79. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 52–61. 
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is a realistic possibility that malicious actors on the Bitcoin network 
could steal currency, or spend the same Bitcoins multiple times,80 
legitimate users and firms would be reluctant to use Bitcoin. 
The great innovation in Bitcoin is to flip the incentive structure, 
by giving network nodes a reason to follow the legitimate consensus 
rather than behave dishonestly.81 Bitcoin’s approach to consensus is 
known as mining.82 Bitcoin nodes repeatedly attempt to solve 
cryptographic hashing puzzles based on the transactions in a proposed 
new block on the blockchain. These puzzles are on a sliding level of 
difficulty so that, roughly every ten minutes, a random node finds a 
solution.83 The new block based on that solution is broadcast across the 
network.84 Other nodes, after checking for validity, add the new block 
to the blockchain.85 In the event of conflicts, they follow the longest 
chain, which is the one the majority of the network supports. The node 
that successfully proposes the new block receives a financial reward. 
These rewards for mining make Bitcoin resistant to attacks. 
Miners have incentives to apply as much computing power as possible 
to confirm valid blocks, because that increases their chance of winning 
the block reward.86 Malicious actors are effectively competing against 
the total computing power in the network. Their blocks will only be 
adopted if they can solve the hashing puzzle before someone else. And 
 
 80. This is known as a double-spend transaction, and is effectively printing money. 
 81. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 61–68; Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4. 
 82. The more technical term for the mining process is Proof of Work. See Nakamoto, supra 
note 3, at 3. 
 83. See Adam Back, A Partial Hash Collision Based Postage Scheme, HASHCASH (Mar. 28, 
1997), http://www.hashcash.org/papers/announce.txt [https://perma.cc/DBV8-PR87] (describing 
a proof of work system to combat email spam). Because nodes must essentially use brute force to 
solve the puzzles, their probability of success is proportional to their computing power. However, 
which node finds a valid solution first is essentially random. 
 84. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 53. 
 85. The network includes additional mechanisms to deal with situations where more than 
one valid block is proposed, whether due to an attack or network latency. Every block in the 
blockchain is cryptographically linked to the block before. Under the Bitcoin protocol, when 
given the choice, nodes add a block to the longest possible blockchain. Every new block added 
thus increases the confidence level that prior blocks represent the consensus. The common 
heuristic in Bitcoin is that after six subsequent blocks (approximately one hour), nodes can be 
sufficiently confident that a block will not be replaced. In Bitcoin, however, trust is probabilistic, 
not absolute. Applications requiring greater security might wait longer before accepting 
transactions from a block, but the trade-off is increased delay before they transfer the Bitcoins or 
associated assets.  
 86. Cf. Kevin Werbach, Bitcoin Is Gamification, MEDIUM (Aug. 5, 2014), https:// 
medium.com/@kwerb/bitcoin-is-gamification-e85c6a6eea22 [https://perma.cc/Q4Q8-4YGG] 
(explaining the significance of the motivational system to Bitcoin). 
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because every block is linked to the previous one, as the chain gets 
longer, it becomes more and more difficult to replace an earlier set of 
transactions. 
An elegant aspect of Bitcoin’s mining system is that those financial 
rewards take the form of Bitcoins themselves.87 Because Bitcoin is 
accepted as a currency, and can also be exchanged for traditional 
currencies, miners find the rewards desirable. Yet, the only reason 
Bitcoin has those properties is the trust generated by mining. Mining 
is, in fact, the only way that new Bitcoins are created. The mining 
reward is halved approximately every four years, meaning there will 
ultimately be no more than approximately 21 million Bitcoins ever 
created.88 As an alternative compensation mechanism, Bitcoin allows 
parties to specify transaction rewards, which are deducted from the 
value of a validated transaction.89 The expectation is that, as the 
available mining rewards decrease, voluntary transaction rewards will 
become the predominant incentive for Bitcoin miners.90 
The combination of the ledger, the network, and consensus 
replaces authorities like financial or central banks, which traditionally 
serve to reinforce trust between transacting parties. If, for example, 
Abby commits to paying Bob one Bitcoin every year as a dividend for 
each share of stock Bob holds in Abby’s company, every distributed 
ledger in the network will correctly reflect that information, because it 
will be encoded into a block of transactions that is immutably linked 
into a sequence. At no point in the future can anyone manipulate the 
 
 87. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 62; Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4. The block 
reward as of mid-2017 is 12.5 Bitcoins, which equates to roughly $25,000 at contemporary 
exchange rates. 
 88. See id., at 63. This enforced scarcity is necessary to support Bitcoin’s value as a currency. 
If the number of Bitcoins could keep growing indefinitely, the currency would be subject to 
massive devaluation due to inflation. The Bitcoin protocol allows Bitcoins to be subdivided down 
to eight decimal places, with the smallest unit being designated as one Satoshi. So, even though 
the exchange rate of a Bitcoin is, as of mid-2017, over $2,000, transactions can involve tiny 
amounts of money, far smaller than the equivalent of one cent.  
 89. Nakamoto called these “transaction fees.” See Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4. We use 
“transaction rewards” to clarify that the sum is offered by the transacting party, and only paid to 
the node that successfully validates a block through the mining process. It is not a fee specified by 
nodes in order to process a block.  
 90. See id. In practice, transaction rewards have grown rapidly because the Bitcoin system 
has struggled to keep up with growth. Users need to attach significant rewards to incentivize 
miners to process their transactions quickly. See Joseph Young, As Recommended Fees Go Past 
$2, Bitcoin Direly Needs a Scaling Solution, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/urgent-necessity-of-a-scaling-solution-recommended-bitcoin-
fees-go-past-2/ [https://perma.cc/BSR9-BXX6]. 
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ledger to change or delete the transaction. Abby and Bob both know 
this and do not need a bank to provide reassurance that the Bitcoin 
transaction is legitimate. As the recipient of the dividend payment, Bob 
can confidently spend that Bitcoin without concerns about its 
legitimacy. 
C. Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts 
As thus described, the blockchain is a general-purpose technology 
for trusted transactions. One important class of trusted transactions is 
contracts. A legally enforceable contract enables parties to coordinate 
their actions and trust that their commitments to each other will be 
fulfilled.91 An inherent constraint on traditional contracting is that the 
parties must trust the state, and a variety of private intermediaries that 
facilitate efficient operation of the system. Legal enforcement of 
contracts can be cumbersome and prone to error. Just as there are 
reasons to use a decentralized digital currency system even though 
traditional currencies are successful, there are reasons to use 
decentralized digital contracts to solve problems that the conventional 
contract system cannot. The basic challenge for decentralized contracts 
is the same as for currencies: reliably ensuring that participants will 
follow the rules and accept their outputs.92 
Szabo’s original conception of smart contracts envisioned that 
cryptography would secure agreements, but had no mechanism to 
guarantee enforcement or transfer of value. Everything changed with 
the development of Bitcoin.93 Bitcoin’s success in decentralizing 
trusted financial transactions gives hope to those who advocate similar 
 
 91. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 
26 (2002) (“The incentive to rely on a promise exists only to the degree that a promise is 
trustworthy.”). As Stewart Macauley famously showed, enforceable contracts enable 
coordination by structuring the relationship between contracting parties, even where threats of 
legal action are rare. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 57 (1963); cf. Carolina Camén, Patrik Gottfridsson & Bo Rundh, To 
Trust or Not To Trust?: Formal Contracts and the Building of Long‐Term Relationships, 49 MGMT. 
DECISION 365, 365 (2011) (studying empirically the role that formal contracts can play in 
cultivating trust). The theory behind smart contracts is built on this idea. See Szabo, supra note 2. 
 92. See FRANÇOIS R. VELDE, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., BITCOIN: A PRIMER 1, 2–
3 (2013) (stating that currencies “derive their value in exchange either from government fiat or 
from the belief that they may be accepted by someone else”). 
 93. Jay Cassano, What Are Smart Contracts? Cryptocurrency’s Killer App, FAST COMPANY 
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.fastcolabs.com/3035723/app-economy/smart-contracts-could-be-
cryptocurrencys-killer-app [https://perma.cc/P7LX-9UFZ]; David Z. Morris, Bitcoin Is Not Just 
Digital Currency. It’s Napster for Finance, FORTUNE (Jan. 21, 2014), http://fortune.com/ 2014/
01/21/bitcoin-is-not-just-digital-currency-its-napster-for-finance [https://perma.cc/UV8E-U3X6]. 
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decentralization of trusted contractual agreements.94 Smart contracts 
may actually be a bigger idea than Bitcoin as a currency.95 They take 
the static ledger and turn it into a dynamic system capable of executing 
the business logic of a contractual agreement. 
Consider a simple insurance contract under which Abby promises 
farmer Bob, in return for a monthly payment, a lump sum in the event 
the temperature exceeds 100 degrees for more than five straight days 
during the term of the agreement. In a traditional contracting 
arrangement, the parties would likely reduce that agreement to a 
writing, signed to memorialize mutual intent. If the temperature 
exceeded the threshold for six straight days and Abby failed to pay, 
Bob could file suit for breach and present the contract as evidence. To 
implement a smart contract with the same terms, Abby and Bob would 
translate the provisions into software code. Each would make available 
sufficient funds to fulfill his or her side of the agreement. An agreed 
mechanism would be specified to determine performance, such as the 
daily high temperature for the area, as published on Weather.com. 
Abby and Bob would then each digitally sign the agreement with their 
private cryptographic key. One of them would send it as a transaction 
onto a blockchain, where it would be validated through the consensus 
process and recorded on the distributed ledger. Bob’s payments would 
automatically be deducted each month and credited to Abby’s account. 
Meanwhile, the smart contract would check the high temperature on 
Weather.com each day and store a record as needed on the blockchain. 
If the temperature exceeded 100 degrees for six days, the lump sum 
payment would be transferred from Abby’s account to Bob’s, and the 
smart contract would terminate. 
The critical distinction between smart contracts and other forms 
of electronic agreements is enforcement. Once the computers 
determine that the requisite state has been achieved, they 
automatically perform data-oriented or computable contracts. 
 
 94. Nick Szabo, Foreword to CHAMBER OF DIG. COMMERCE, SMART CONTRACTS: 12 USE 
CASES FOR BUSINESS & BEYOND 3 (2016), http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/ Smart%20 
Contracts%20%2012%20Use%20Cases%20for%20Business%20and%20Beyond%20%20Cha
mber%20of%20Digital%20Commerce.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZZT-9NX8] (“Blockchain 
technology appears very much to be the jet fuel necessary for smart contracts to become 
commonplace in business transactions and beyond.”). 
 95. See Cassano, supra note 93. The currency aspect of Bitcoin is necessary, regardless of the 
application, because it provides the incentive structure for mining, at least in the ramp-up stage 
before transaction fees become dominant. Conceivably, Bitcoin could fail to have a significant 
impact on the financial system but still be the basis for the massive adoption of smart contracts. 
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Humans can interrupt that execution at any point.96 But with a smart 
contract, complete execution of the agreement, including any transfer 
of value, occurs without any such opportunity to interrupt.97 
Accordingly, juridical forums are powerless to stop the execution of 
smart contracts—there is no room to bring an action for breach when 
breach is impossible. The computers in the blockchain network ensure 
performance, rather than any appendage of the state.98 And, because 
blockchains run on a distributed network of independent nodes, with 
no central control point,99 a litigant seeking to enjoin performance of a 
smart contract has no one to sue.100 
 
 96. If a contract is executed on a traditional centralized computer system, the organization 
in control of that system can always stop execution. On a blockchain, no single entity controls the 
execution process. Furthermore, the output of a data-oriented or computable contract is at best 
only of provisional legal value. See Surden, supra note 15, at 637 n.25 (“[A]utomated assessments 
will often be ‘first cut’ approximations of an ultimate, legally authoritative determination as to 
compliance.”). 
 97. See infra Part II.B.3. The only exception to immutable execution of a smart contract is a 
fork which splits the entire blockchain into incompatible tracks. If enough network nodes follow 
the track without the smart contract, it effectively no longer exists. However, such a move is so 
technically and politically costly that it rarely if ever occurs on functioning blockchains. See infra 
note 177 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Karen E.C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts 
and the Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y. 1, 2 (2017) (“Because they 
are based on code, smart contracts can be immediately and automatically effectuated, 
without . . . the intervention of institutions like courts.”). The power of the smart contract is, 
however, limited to those assets which can be incorporated or controlled by a blockchain. A smart 
contract for construction of a house could not force the builder to perform, for example, nor could 
a smart contract to purchase a painting physically move it to the buyer’s home. With techniques 
such as “smart property,” however, more assets will be susceptible to blockchain control. See 
Fairfield, supra note 57, at 825–28. 
 99. The organizations developing the blockchain’s software have no power over the network 
nodes that validate transactions. Even if a court ordered the software developers to issue an 
update that halted a particular smart contract, the miners would not have to adopt it. And because 
anyone around the world can set up a mining node on a public blockchain such as Bitcoin or 
Ethereum, there would be no way for that court to enforce compliance by the miners.  
Exactly how powerless a court would be depends on the system. It is possible to use the 
basic technical approach of a blockchain to execute smart contracts on a “permissioned” network 
in which nodes must be authenticated and approved. See Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-a-Service: 
A Brief Report on the Emergence of Permissioned, Distributed Ledger Systems, GREAT WALL OF 
NUMBERS (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-
distributed-ledgers.pdf [https://perma.cc/V36W-EFPA]. Those nodes could be contractually 
bound to follow duly issued judicial decisions. Even in that scenario, the practicalities of judicial 
oversight of the contract could be quite challenging. Further, it is unclear why a permissioned 
blockchain network would deliberately compromise the automation and certainty upon which the 
efficiency gains of smart contracts are premised. 
 100. Operators of sites connected to a blockchain, such as the infamous Silk Road online 
marketplace for illegal transactions using Bitcoin, may be brought to the bar. Silk Road operator 
Ross Ulbricht was eventually caught by U.S. law enforcement authorities and sentenced to life in 
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The blockchain’s distributed trust facilitates smart contracts 
between unknown or untrusted counterparties.101 This radical 
decentralization is what potentially makes smart contracting a 
substitute for the state-based legal system, rather than an additional 
step before reaching that system. For example, a financial trading 
program that automatically buys certain stocks when prices match a 
predefined algorithm, could be described as a smart contract. If a 
dispute arises, however, the parties to that self-executing transaction 
will still turn to the courts, which will apply traditional legal doctrines 
to evaluate the agreement, ascertain breach, and impose a remedy if 
appropriate. With smart contracts, the transaction is irreversibly 
encoded on a distributed blockchain. A judicial decision holding a 
smart contract unenforceable cannot undo the results of its fully 
executed agreement.  
Smart contracts are possible with Bitcoin because its protocols 
include a scripting language that can incorporate limited 
programmable logic into transactions.102 The vast majority of 
transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain are simple transfers of Bitcoins 
between accounts.103 Additionally, when computers on the Bitcoin 
network process those transfers, they can perform other functions.104 
This allows for more complicated arrangements, like delaying payment 
until a specified number of parties provide confirmation. 
Bitcoin’s native scripting language is limited. Companies are 
developing more powerful systems that execute the contractual logic 
on application servers outside the blockchain, or through alternate 
blockchains supporting more sophisticated scripts. The most heralded 
is Ethereum, a general-purpose computing platform on a blockchain 
foundation.105 Ethereum is a competing system to Bitcoin. It uses the 
 
prison. Kevin McCoy, Silk Road Mastermind Ross Ulbricht Loses Legal Appeal, USA TODAY 
(May 31, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/31/silk-road-
mastermind-ross-ulbricht-loses-legal-appeal/102343062 [https://perma.cc/V56Q-SKGS]. The 
blockchains themselves are another story. 
 101. See generally Werbach, supra note 17 (describing the blockchain’s “trustless trust” 
architecture). 
 102. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 79–84. 
 103. See id. at 82–83 (observing that 99.9 percent of Bitcoin transactions at the time were 
straight transfers of coins). 
 104. See id. at 84. 
 105. See Tina Amirtha, Meet Ether, the Bitcoin-Like Cryptocurrency That Could Power the 
Internet of Things, FAST COMPANY (May 21, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3046385/meet-
ether-the-bitcoin-like-cryptocurrency-that-could-power-the-internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/
77R6-ZE3F]; A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, 
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same basic approach of a distributed ledger, a network of validation 
nodes, and consensus through mining. However, the virtual currency 
in the system, called Ether, is designed for purchasing computing 
power on the Ethereum network, rather than as an alternative to 
traditional currencies. Ethereum’s scripting language is significantly 
more powerful than Bitcoin’s. It is Turing complete, which means it can 
in theory execute any function that can be processed by a computer.106 
The promise of Ethereum is almost comically broad: one article 
suggested it might “transform law, finance, and civil society.”107 While 
such enthusiasm may be excessive, Ethereum has gained a substantial 
and passionate following among developers and cryptocurrency 
enthusiasts. Roughly a year after Ethereum launched, there were 
already over three hundred distributed apps built on the platform.108 In 
one of the largest crowdfunding campaigns to that point, Ethereum 
raised over $18 million worth of Bitcoin in the initial sale of Ether.109 A 
number of more specialized blockchain-based platforms employing 
smart contracts launched after Ethereum. 
The scripting language on a blockchain platform like Bitcoin or 
Ethereum can be used to determine whether the conditions for 
performance of a smart contract have been met, and then execute the 
contractual transaction without human interference.110 In the simplest 
case, parties place Bitcoins or other digital currency into a suspended 
state on the blockchain, and once certain terms are met, those Bitcoins 
are transferred to the appropriate account.111 The Bitcoins may 
 
GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper [https://perma.cc/4DLU-SJD3]; 
Jim Epstein, Here Comes Ethereum, an Information Technology Dreamed Up by a Wunderkind 
19-Year-Old That Could One Day Transform Law, Finance, and Civil Society, REASON.COM 
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://reason.com/blog/2015/03/19/here-comes-ethereum-an-information-techn 
[https://perma.cc/X6QU-SK83]; D.J. Pangburn, The Humans Who Dream of Companies That 
Won’t Need Us, FAST COMPANY (June 19, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/ 3047462/the-
humans-who-dream-of-companies-that-wont-need-them [https://perma.cc/MW9R-CURA]. 
 106. See A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, supra 
note 105. 
 107. Epstein, supra note 105. 
 108. See STATE OF THE DAPPS, http://dapps.ethercasts.com [https://perma.cc/4T99-URGE]. 
 109. Nathan Schneider, After the Bitcoin Gold Rush, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121089/how-small-bitcoin-miners-lose-crypto-currency-
boom-bust-cycle [https://perma.cc/Z7UQ-ZCUZ]. Even though Ether is not intended as a 
replacement for cash, it can be exchanged for other currencies at a floating rate. Demand for 
Ether, based on the utility of the Ethereum smart contract platform, makes the tokens more 
valuable. 
 110. See NARAYANAN, supra note 12, at 286–88. 
 111. See Cassano, supra note 93. Not all smart contracts require funds to be placed in this 
escrow state. First, many contracts do not involve direct transfers of funds. Second, 
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represent payment directly, or they may be used as tokens, associated 
with digital rights in assets. 
This algorithmic enforcement allows contracts to be executed as 
quickly and cheaply as other computer code. Cost savings occur at 
every stage, from negotiation to enforcement, especially in replacing 
judicial enforcement with automated mechanisms.112 If smart contracts 
are substantially cheaper and more efficient, more situations can 
benefit from the use of contractual agreements; for example, dynamic 
transactions around physical objects (smart property)113 or offerings for 
those unable to afford traditional legal services.114 Another broad 
attraction of smart contracts is their fundamentally decentralized 
nature. Those who wish to avoid trust in centralized private or 
governmental actors, for political reasons or otherwise, can do so and 
still benefit from the advantages of contract. 
Even though blockchain transactions are irrevocable, there are 
ways to build in more flexibility. There is no technical means, short of 
undermining the integrity of the entire system, to unwind a transfer.115 
It is, however, possible to incorporate logic into a smart contract that 
permits exceptions or conditions.116 Enforcement could theoretically 
be structured to permit arbitration.117 Such flexibility, however, must 
be coded into the smart contract at the outset, which takes away from 
the decentralization and efficiency that make smart contracts attractive 
 
cryptocurrency can be used as a token to designate other assets or rights, such as title to real 
property. Smart contract system developers are now working through the issues involved to apply 
smart contracts to more complex instruments such as financial derivatives, where counterparties 
typically do not prefund all transactions so as to maximize liquidity. See Luke Clancy, Barclays 
Taps Blockchain for Equity Swaps, Options, Swaptions, RISK.NET (May 16, 2016), http:// www.
risk.net/derivatives/2457777/barclays-taps-blockchain-equity-swaps-options-swaptions [https://
perma.cc/VX56-JGYK]. 
 112. Of course, there is a trade-off for the certainty of algorithmic enforcement, as will be 
discussed in infra Part IV. 
 113. See Fairfield, supra note 57, at 825–28; Cassano, supra note 93. 
 114. See Cassano, supra note 93. 
 115. See Paul Vigna, Ethereum Gets Its Hard Fork, and the ‘Truth’ Gets Tested, WALL. ST. J.: 
MONEYBEAT BLOG (July 20, 2016 10:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/ 
07/20/ethereum-gets-its-hard-fork-and-the-truth-gets-tested/ [https://perma.cc/8PXE-RBRG] 
(describing such a “hard fork” needed to unwind a fraudulent transaction on the Ethereum 
network). 
 116. These are simply additional terms of the contract conveyed through the scripting 
language of the blockchain system. 
 117. Pamela Morgan, At Bitcoin South: Innovating Legal Systems Through Blockchain 
Technology, BRAVE NEW COIN (Dec. 17, 2014), http://bravenewcoin.com/news/pamela-morgan-
at-bitcoin-south-innovating-legal-systems-through-blockchain-technology [https://perma.cc/
8446-WHPN]. 
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to begin with. 
Sometimes a smart contract refers to facts in the world, for 
example, when a contract pays out if a stock exceeds a certain price on 
a certain date. The Bitcoin blockchain knows nothing about stock 
prices; it must collect that information through an external data feed. 
In the language of smart contracts, systems that interpret such external 
feeds and verify contractual performance are called “oracles.”118 
Unlike the blockchain itself, oracles are not fully decentralized. The 
contracting parties must, to some degree, trust the operator of the 
oracle and the authenticity of its data feed.119 
Using these capabilities, a wide variety of industries could employ 
smart contracts. Beyond simple financial arrangements, smart 
contracts could facilitate complex instruments like wills120 or 
crowdfunding systems, both of which disburse funds only if certain 
contingencies trigger a payout.121 Another category is smart property, 
for which the rights associated with objects attach to the objects 
themselves.122 Networked door locks on a shared car system such as 
Zipcar could automatically open, but only for the individual that paid 
the access fee. Or, a lessor could shut off a delinquent lessee’s access to 
a leased car, and give access to the bank, but only until full payment of 
 
 118. See Smart Oracles: A Simple, Powerful Approach to Smart Contracts, GITHUB (July 17, 
2014), https://github.com/codius/codius/wiki/Smart-Oracles:-A-Simple,-Powerful-Approach-to-
Smart-Contracts [https://perma.cc/YWJ3-CQPQ]. 
 119. There are, however, efforts to create distributed oracles using blockchain-based 
prediction markets such as Augur and Gnosis, which use financial incentives and the wisdom of 
crowds to evaluate statements. See Cade Metz, Forget Bitcoin. The Blockchain Could Reveal 
What’s True Today and Tomorrow, WIRED (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.wired.com/ 
2017/03/forget-bitcoin-blockchain-reveal-whats-true-today-tomorrow [https://perma.cc/828D-
3R58]. 
 120. See Morris, supra note 93. A will implemented through smart contracts would specify the 
distribution of assets in the estate according to a set of rules. The contract could be activated with 
presentation of a specified private key by the executor of the estate. A hypothetical set of rules 
might transfer the entire balance of the estate to the private key associated with the decedent’s 
spouse. In the event the spouse was also deceased (as verified by the executor’s presentation of 
another private key), the funds would be divided equally among the decedent’s two children. This 
scenario would work most simply for assets held in the form of cryptocurrencies. However, the 
blockchain could also record access rights to bank accounts, title to real estate, or other tokens 
associated with traditional assets.  
 121. See Stan Higgins, Bitcoin-Powered Crowdfunding App Lighthouse Has Launched, 
COINDESK (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-powered-crowdfunding-app-
lighthouse-launches-open-beta/ [https://perma.cc/W7WQ-9VLN]; Paul Vigna & Michael J. 
Casey, The Car of the Future May Ownerless as well as Driverless, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 3, 
2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-bitcoin-technology-could-power-driverless-cars-
2015-03-03 [https://perma.cc/37NV-W5EL]. 
 122. See Fairfield, supra note 57, at 863. 
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the principal. More broadly, over twenty-five billion devices 
comprising the Internet of Things, from light switches to crop moisture 
monitors, are expected to connect to the internet by 2020.123 Smart 
contracts would allow these devices to operate autonomously, share 
resources, and exchange data without central management.124 
Some blockchain advocates go further. They envision smart 
contracts as the foundation of a new kind of economic entity, the 
distributed autonomous organization (DAO).125 If a corporation is 
simply a nexus of contracts,126 why not encode those agreements into 
digital self-enforcing agreements? A DAO could have stock 
ownership, corporate governance rules, payroll arrangements, and 
virtually all of the economic trappings of a modern corporation, all 
running automatically in a completely distributed manner. 
With the success of Ethereum and other blockchain-based 
platforms offering smart contracting capabilities, Szabo’s twenty-year-
old hypothetical has become an operational reality. Over one hundred 
major corporations including JPMorgan Chase, IBM, BP, Microsoft, 
Toyota, and Merck, have joined a consortium to promote enterprise 
adoption of Ethereum.127 Many others are supporting competing 
initiatives.128 
As is so often the case, though, this technology’s adoption is 
preceding full consideration of its legal implications. Smart contracts 
are not just an interesting computer science innovation, because they 
 
 123. See Colin Barker, Is Blockchain the Key to the Internet of Things? IBM and Samsung 
Think It Might Just Be, ZDNET (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/is-blockchain-the-
key-to-the-internet-of-things-ibm-and-samsung-think-it-might-just-be/ [https://perma.cc/SR5T-
ERN4]. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Vitalik Buterin, Bootstrapping A Decentralized Autonomous Corporation: Part I, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Sept. 19, 2013), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/7050/bootstrapping-a-decentralized 
-autonomous-corporation-part-i [https://perma.cc/V8ZY-NK2J]; David Johnston et al., The 
General Theory of Decentralized Applications, Dapps, GITHUB, https://github.com/David 
JohnstonCEO/DecentralizedApplications [https://perma.cc/4C9S-J3ZH]. 
 126. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). 
 127. See Matthew Leising, Toyota, Merck Join Ethereum Group To Build Blockchain 
Network, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/
2017-05-22/toyota-merck-join-ethereum-group-to-build-blockchain-network [https://perma.cc/
GJ67-ZHKW].  
 128. See, e.g., Arjun Kharpal, Intel and Major Banks, Including HSBC and BOAML, Pour 
$107 Million Into Blockchain Group, CNBC (May 23, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2017/05/23/r3-funding-blockchain-intel-bank-of-america-hsbc.html [https://perma.cc/SV2Y-
GX54] (detailing new funding for the financial industry blockchain platform R3). 
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tread on one of the most fundamental territories of the common law: 
the domain of contract. 
II.  CONCEPTUALIZING SMART CONTRACTS 
A. Are Smart Contracts Contracts? 
The first important question that smart contracts pose is: Are they 
actually contracts? Ultimately, we think the answer is “yes.” But this 
question turns out to be ambiguous, requiring the answer to another 
question first: What do we mean by a “contract”? Different ways of 
defining contracts, in terms of legal enforceability, intent of the parties, 
or an exchange of promises, all complicate the analysis of whether 
smart contracts are contracts at all. After considering such standard 
definitions, we will suggest that smart contracts should nonetheless be 
considered contracts because they are agent-generated mechanisms to 
shift rights and obligations. 
According to the standard legal definition, a contract is a promise 
or an agreement that is legally enforceable.129 This definition, though 
widely accepted, has the unfortunate linguistic consequence of 
implying that agreements that turn out to be unenforceable were not 
contracts to begin with. Terms like “unconscionable contract,” 
“fraudulent contract,” and “illegal contract,” all become something 
like oxymorons.130 Even commonplace judicial iterations of this 
standard, like “[t]o be legally enforceable, a contract must be 
supported by consideration,”131 become essentially redundant. 
But we care about whether smart contracts are contracts in the 
ordinary sense, whether they are enforceable or not.132 At a general 
conceptual level, are smart contracts actually contracts? So it seems 
 
 129. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract 
is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
 130. But cf., e.g., United States v. Nunez, 673 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2012) (“‘[C]onspiracy’ . . . 
is simply a pejorative term for a contract, both ‘conspiracy’ and ‘contract’ signifying an agreement, 
a meeting of minds.”).  
 131. See, e.g., Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 780 (N.M. 1993) (“[T]o be legally 
enforceable, a contract must be factually supported by an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and 
mutual assent.”). 
 132. Along these lines, Thomas Joo distinguished between “Rs,” which are simply 
relationships of reciprocal expectations and behavior, and “Ks,” which are legally enforceable. 
See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 779, 790 (2002). One way to pose the question that we are now asking would be: 
Are smart contracts Rs, whether or not they are Ks? 
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that we need a different definition of “contract” for these purposes. 
One way to understand the question would be: Do smart contracts 
constitute promises or agreements that are intended to be legally 
enforceable? Corresponding to this formation of the question, another 
definition of a contract is an agreement intended to be legally 
enforceable, whether it turns out to be or not.133 This definition has the 
advantage of avoiding the issues raised above, because it leaves open 
the question of enforceability. The unenforceable contract is still, 
conceptually, a contract as long as the parties thought that it would be 
enforceable, wrong though they may have been. 
Of course, the intent that matters here is objective, not subjective, 
intent as it is manifested by the actions of the parties. As Judge Hand 
famously explained, “[a] contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do 
with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an 
obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the 
parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a 
known intent.”134 Still, according to this understanding, a contract 
exists if and only if the actions of the parties, judged objectively, 
manifest an intention that an agreement is to be legally enforceable. 
When applied to smart contracts, this definition raises a serious 
issue. Smart contracts are designed to eliminate the need for legal 
enforcement. The central feature of a smart contract—what 
supposedly makes them smart—is that legal enforcement will not be 
necessary, or even possible. In a very real way, smart contracts are not 
intended to be legally enforceable. This is not to suggest that they are 
intended to be legally invalid; rather, the question of legal enforcement 
should never arise. In this sense, smart contracts are not intended to be 
enforced in a legal proceeding. This lack of intent may lead to the 
conclusion that, even conceptually, smart contracts are not truly 
contracts at all. They may look more like so-called “gentlemen’s 
agreements,” intended to be carried out, but never intended to reach a 
 
 133. See, e.g., EARL OF HALSBURY, 7 LAWS OF ENGLAND § 682 (1909) (“A contract is an 
agreement made between two or more persons which is intended to be enforceable at law . . . .”); 
see also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[O]nce a court concludes a 
promise is legally enforceable according to contract law, it has implicitly concluded that the 
promisor has manifestly intended that the court enforce his promise.”). 
 134. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); see also Lucy v. Zehmer, 
84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954) (“If his words and acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest 
an intention to agree, it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[I]t is clear that a 
mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the obligation he purports to 
undertake.”). 
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courtroom. 
This appearance would be misleading, however, because it is quite 
different to intend that a solution will not be needed than to intend that 
it will be unavailable. I do not intend that my car will be needed as a 
vehicle for escaping the zombie apocalypse, but if the zombie 
apocalypse comes, I do not intend to abandon my car and traverse the 
wasteland on foot. By the same token, smart contracts are not intended 
to be enforced by a court, but that’s not to say that, if they end up in 
court, the parties intend them to be unenforceable. 
It is better to think of a contract as any agreement that is meant to 
have practical consequences on the rights and duties of the parties—
that is, is not merely aspirational.135 This avoids the above difficulty, 
because whether legal enforcement was anticipated is irrelevant.136 
Smart contracts would be contracts as long as they manifest an 
exchange of concrete obligations. They would be contracts as long as 
they are meant to alter concretely the normative relation between the 
parties. 
Yet there is still some difficulty with this definition, because this 
understanding of a contract requires an exchange of promises or 
obligations. Do smart contracts involve promises or obligations? In a 
significant sense, “no.” The smart contract sets in motion machinery 
that the parties cannot subsequently prevent. The smart contract is not 
fulfilled by some further action of a contracting party, but rather by the 
completion of this mechanical process. As an analogy, if Bob balances 
a pail of water on top of a door, he does not promise to drop water on 
whoever next opens the door. Rather, he has merely set up the 
mechanical process by which that will inevitably happen. In a similar 
way, a smart contract to transfer one Bitcoin upon such-and-such event 
occurring is not really a promise at all. A smart contract would not say, 
“I will pay you one Bitcoin if such-and-such happens,” but rather 
something like, “you will be paid one Bitcoin if such-and-such 
happens.” 
 
 135. See, e.g., W. David Rankin, Concerning an Expectancy Based Remedial Theory of 
Promissory Estoppel, 69 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 116, 142 (2011) (“[A] contract creates rights 
and duties because, as purposive beings, self-determining agents may transfer the power to direct 
their choices to other persons, and rights and duties are required to mark the resultant scope of 
the parties’ freedom after the transfer.”). 
 136. See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1460 (2009) (arguing that 
departure from any intention to create legal enforceability makes sense because “[c]ontracts 
create legal rights and duties” and “[t]he conditions of contractual validity function . . . to inform 
people of their rights and duties ex ante”). 
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Some of the computer scientists working on smart contracts 
appear to be vaguely aware of this point. For example, Ethereum’s 
white paper states that its contracts “should not be seen as something 
that should be ‘fulfilled’ or ‘complied with’; rather, they are more like 
‘autonomous agents’ that live inside of the Ethereum execution 
environment.”137 As this suggests, the language of “contracts” is a poor 
fit, because this sort of smart contract is not an exchange of promises 
or commitments. Creation of a smart contract—while setting certain 
events in motion—does not commit any party to do anything, or make 
any prospective promise. 
Nevertheless, we believe that smart contracts are, at the 
conceptual level, still contracts.138 Though they might not constitute 
promises per se, smart contracts are voluntary mechanisms that 
purport to alter the rights and duties of the parties. After all, not all 
traditional contracts are executory, either. A deal may still count as a 
contract even though it leaves nothing open to be done or performed. 
A conveyance, for example, is a contract that alters rights presently, 
and does not involve any further, open promises. Smart contracts 
similarly constitute present agreements without further promises to 
perform. The simple Bitcoin smart contract just imagined is more like 
a present but contingent conveyance than it is like an executory 
promise to pay. 
Thus, the smart contract somewhat breaks down the traditional 
line between executory and executed contracts. Like the conveyance, 
there is no promise left to be performed. Unlike the conveyance, 
though, the smart contract does not transfer property at the time. It is 
neither executory, insofar as there is no action left to be performed, 
nor is it executed, insofar as the result is yet to be accomplished. This 
causes conceptual difficulty. Smart contracts are both committing to 
something in the future, but not exactly making a promise. As we 
discuss below,139 this hybrid between ex ante commitment and ex post 
 
 137. A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, supra note 
105; see also Explainer: Smart Contracts, supra note 14 (“[S]mart contracts are neither particularly 
smart nor are they, strictly speaking, contracts.”); Leithaus, Comment to Isn’t Ethereum Just a 
DSL for the Blockchain?, REDDIT.COM, https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/ 
31rnmh/isnt_ethereum_just_a_dsl_for_the_blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/44DG-ZV54] (“I now 
regret calling the objects in Ethereum ‘contracts’, [sic] as you’re meant to think of them as 
arbitrary programs and not smart contracts specifically.”). 
 138. For a more doctrinal analysis by an international law firm that reaches a similar 
conclusion, see NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, supra note 12. 
 139. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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enforcement is novel. 
In the end, though, this complication raises more questions about 
the conventional definitions of contracts than it does about whether 
smart contracts are contracts. There can be little doubt that smart 
contracts purport to alter the rights of the parties. The smart contract 
can explain, normatively as well as descriptively, why the Bitcoin 
belongs to one party and not the other. It constitutes an agreement 
between the parties, and not an idle one. That, we believe, is the 
essence of a contract. But it is an interesting conceptual observation—
illuminated by the smart contract—that even yet-to-be-executed 
contracts need not create promissory obligations. 
There is one final difficulty to overcome. Are smart contracts 
really agreements? After all, they are simply a chunk of code. 
Superficially, they may look nothing like a set of declarations in the 
form “Party X agrees to do such-and-such.” In general, a legal contract 
requires mutual assent, a “meeting of the minds,”140 meaning that both 
parties must have expressed assent to the contract.141 That is, contracts 
require overt acts of assent.142 Parties must engage in some expression 
that displays a shared understanding of the agreement, and a shared 
intent to bind themselves by its terms. Can smart contracts, simply a 
chunk of code in a blockchain, constitute such shared expression? 
Nothing, so far as we can tell, prevents an expression of mutual 
assent from being formulated in code.143 In general, mutual assent can 
take many forms, so long as it clearly implies agreement.144 As Surden 
puts it, “[a]t a minimum, contract laws do not explicitly prohibit 
expressing contractual obligations in terms of data. More affirmatively, 
basic contracting principles actively accommodate data-oriented 
 
 140. See, e.g., Krasley v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 629, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“The 
essence of a contract is the meeting of minds on the essential features of the agreement.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 141. See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.13 (Matthew Bender & 
Co. 2017) (1950) (“[A contract requires] mutual expressions of assent to the exchange. These 
expressions . . . are external symbols of the thoughts and intentions of one party, symbols that 
convey these thoughts and intentions to the mind of the other party.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Kitzke v. Turnidge, 307 P.2d 522, 527 (Or. 1957) (“The law of contracts is not 
concerned with the parties’ undisclosed intents and ideas. It gives heed only to their 
communications and overt acts.”).  
 143. We are assuming the parties have some understanding of what the code is intended to 
accomplish. As Scholz points out, they could essentially agree to agree, and let the algorithms do 
the rest. This may be the case with some computable contracts today, as in the case of high-
frequency trading. See Scholz, supra note 33. However, this is not an inherent problem with smart 
contracts, whose key differentiation lies in complete enforcement. 
 144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 & illus. 1 & 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
WERBACH & CORNELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2017 11:58 AM 
2017] CONTRACTS EX MACHINA 343 
representation.”145 In the present context, such data-oriented 
representations could easily include a blockchain. Where one party 
puts on the blockchain that assets of theirs will transfer to another 
party if some condition is satisfied, that seems to easily satisfy the 
requirement of an expression of assent. 
This description in terms of a party putting the code on the 
blockchain does point to a wrinkle. Smart contracts, on Ethereum and 
presumably on other platforms, are by default unilateral, because only 
one party places them on the blockchain.146 That is, the default involves 
one party specifying a transfer to another if certain conditions are met. 
Out of this default, one could approximate a bilateral or multilateral 
contract through the creation of two or more interrelated unilateral 
contracts.147 But two unilateral contracts are not precisely the same as 
a bilateral contract.148 Fashioning interdependent conditions in a way 
that would emulate a bilateral contract might be a challenge for smart 
contracts. But for the purposes of this Article, we will leave this issue 
aside and generally focus on unilateral contracts, because we think the 
same basic analysis would apply to bilateral contracts as they might be 
formulated as smart contracts. 
To sum up, smart contracts are contracts. They are agreements to 
shift legal rights and responsibilities, no less than an agreement 
between two parties physically exchanging goods for payment over a 
counter. Their status as contracts might be obscured by the fact that 
the parties intend litigation to be impossible, may not make any 
promise, and may be expressed only in code. We suggest that these 
details do not alter the fact that smart contracts are, indeed, contracts 
in the important sense. 
B. What’s New Here? 
Is a smart contract really any different than an ordinary one? The 
fact that smart contracts manifest agreements in machine-readable 
code is not novel, and neither is the possibility of automated 
performance based on rules-based judgments by computers. Both are 
 
 145. Surden, supra note 15, at 656. 
 146. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 314; Casey Kuhlman, Legal Approaches to Smart Contract 
Development (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnFqOfR5a7I#t=29m25s. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Francesco Parisi, Barbara Luppi & Vincy Fon, Optimal Remedies for Bilateral 
Contracts, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 247 (2011) (illustrating from an economic perspective that, 
“contrary to intuition, the incentives faced in a bilateral contract are different from those that the 
parties would face if entering into two separate unilateral contracts”). 
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features of data-oriented and computable contracts, which have been 
around for some time.149 And just because smart contracts are being 
implemented today on the exotic technology of the blockchain does 
not mean they raise novel or interesting legal issues. As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has argued, new technologies do not necessarily call for 
new legal doctrines, when fact patterns are fundamentally 
unchanged.150  
We consider two perspectives suggesting that smart contracts are 
just technological manifestations of familiar contractual processes: 
escrow and self-help. One perspective focuses on the mechanism smart 
contracts use to ensure the execution of agreements, and the other 
perspective focuses on the way smart contracts employ technology to 
impose a remedy outside of the court system. Each perspective sheds 
light on the nature of smart contracts. However, neither perspective 
fully captures the way smart contracts operate. Smart contracts are 
distinct from preexisting forms because the digital code is not just a 
representation of the agreement; it is the agreement. 
1. Smart Contracts as Escrow.  One could view smart contracts as 
simple escrow arrangements with a digital veneer. In a typical escrow 
agreement, such as a house purchase, the buyer places funds in a 
special account. The escrow agent can only withdraw and disburse 
these funds to the seller after successful inspection and resolution of 
any other prepurchase issues. More generally, escrow suspends 
execution of a valid contract, and empowers a trusted third party to 
complete the process. Among other attributes, this approach 
overcomes the possibility of a prisoner’s dilemma when the parties do 
not fully trust one another; otherwise, whichever one acted first would 
be vulnerable. The escrow arrangement substitutes mutual trust in the 
escrow agent for bilateral trust between the parties. 
Smart contracts mimic the functionality of escrow. The smart 
contract code can place Bitcoins or other cryptocurrency tokens in a 
suspended state on the blockchain, where they cannot be spent until 
performance of the contract.151 The execution step may be fully 
 
 149. See supra Part I.A. 
 150. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 208. Judge Easterbrook was surely correct about this general point, but he may not have won 
the particular debate about the viability of cyberlaw. See Kevin Werbach, The Song Remains the 
Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Internet Economy, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017). 
 151. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 84–85 (explaining how Bitcoin scripts can 
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automated, or it may be implemented through multiple-signature 
verification, known as multisig.152 In order for a multisig smart contract 
to execute, more than one party must provide its private encryption 
keys, indicating approval to execute the previously agreed-upon 
transaction.153 If Abby wishes to purchase digital goods from Bob using 
a smart contract, the parties can use a multisig smart contract, for which 
the ultimate execution requires the digital signatures of two out of 
three parties, typically the buyer, the seller, and a trusted third party, 
such as an arbitrator. If the contract is satisfactory, the buyer and seller 
sign, executing the terms of the contract. If either party refuses, 
claiming breach, the arbitrator’s signature decides the outcome. 
Startups are already using the sophisticated capabilities of smart 
contracts to apply escrow in new ways. For example, CryptoCorp uses 
multisig for preclearance checks on Bitcoin transactions, similar to the 
way credit card companies decline transactions if the card has been 
subject to fraud or the payment exceeds preset limits.154 BitHalo has 
implemented an escrow system for e-commerce transactions that 
avoids the participation of third parties entirely, by requiring collateral 
to be stored on the blockchain.155 
The fact that smart contracts can implement escrow agreements 
does not make them identical to escrow. Conventional escrow depends 
upon a trusted firm or third party, because the parties themselves 
cannot serve as the escrow agents. A smart contract reliant on an 
arbitrator gives up the decentralized trust that the blockchain makes 
possible. Smart contracts performing only escrow-like functions are 
therefore more like standard data-oriented contracts. A true smart 
contract may employ the escrow-like mechanism of holding Bitcoins 
temporarily, but it does so through automated execution of scripts 
running on the network of computers maintaining the blockchain, 
without an escrow agent equivalent. 
 
mimic escrow transactions); Cassano, supra note 93. 
 152. See Ben Davenport, What Is Multi-Sig, and What Can It Do?, COIN CENTER (Jan. 1, 
2015), https://coincenter.org/2015/01/multi-sig/ [https://perma.cc/W4VN-HTQT].  
 153. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 80. 
 154. See John Villasenor, Could “Multisig” Help Bring Consumer Protection to Bitcoin 
Transactions?, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2014, 9:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/ 
2014/03/28/could-multisig-help-bring-consumer-protection-to-bitcoin-transactions/ [https://
perma.cc/QGG8-LAXB].  
 155. See Diana Ngo, BitHalo Releases Decentralized Escrow Client v2.1 to Rival PayPal, 
Western Union, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2015), http://cointelegraph.com/news/113286/bithalo-
releases-decentralized-escrow-client-v21-to-rival-paypal-western-union [https://perma.cc/JY2K-
CVCB].  
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2. Smart Contracts as Self-Help.  Researcher Max Raskin provides 
a different interpretation of smart contracts. He views them not as legal 
enforcement at all, but as a form of self-help.156 To Raskin, 
“[a]utomated execution of a contract is a preemptive form of self-help 
because no recourse to a court is needed for the machine to execute 
the agreement.”157 He draws an analogy to starter interrupters, which 
are remote-controlled devices installed in cars to prevent them from 
operating.158 A creditor can invoke the starter interrupter if the lessee 
of the car fails to pay. As Raskin notes, such devices are likely to be 
legal in most states, under the self-help repossession provisions for 
secured creditors at Section 9-609 of the UCC.159 A smart contract 
could serve the same function, by refusing to authorize operation of 
the car unless the creditor receives payment. 
Viewing smart contracts as self-help mechanisms accurately places 
the emphasis on the ex post enforcement function.160 The blockchain 
can be used to record contractual provisions, execute contractual 
obligations, and perform intermediary functions like escrow, but so can 
garden-variety digital contracts. It is only when disputes arise, or when 
the remedies provided in the contract must be invoked, that smart 
contracts do something special. The algorithmic enforcement 
mechanisms, running automatically on the blockchain computing 
fabric, replace judicial enforcement.161 
Self-help, traditionally, is a judicially supervised process.162 Courts 
may restrain creditors from “disturbing the peace” to enforce their self-
help rights, for example, or if a creditor’s rights are inferior to other 
legal obligations, such as those of bankruptcy.163 With a smart contract, 
there is no one to restrain, because the smart contract code is 
 
 156. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 306 (“Over the past few years, a group of innovators have 
begun designing computer technologies that bring self-help to the realm of contracts. They call 
these new contracts ‘smart contracts.’”). 
 157. Id. at 333. 
 158. See id. at 329–33. 
 159. See id. at 332. 
 160. See Zoë Sinel, De-Ciphering Self-Help, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 31, 58–65 (2017) (explaining 
that self-help, properly understood, is responding to a committed wrong, and that ex ante 
measures are not properly considered self-help because they are not so responding). 
 161. See supra Part I.C. 
 162. See Sinel, supra note 160, at 66–67 (“[S]elf-help is a [limited] privilege . . . . Only the 
state’s legal institutions (which include legally recognized agreements between two parties – that 
is, contracts) can effect [it] . . . . As such, self-help is not an alternative to the civil justice system 
but rather one small part of it.”). 
 163. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 310. 
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immutable once embedded in the blockchain. A smart contract could 
even include terms that are illegal, unconscionable, or otherwise legally 
unenforceable.164 
More deeply, the self-help model focuses on what smart contracts 
do to the exclusion of what they say. Functionally, the primary 
distinction between smart contracts and more limited data-oriented or 
computable contracts lies in enforcement. The smart contract, as we 
have explained, fully executes the agreement. It addresses the 
possibility of breach, not through the deterrent potential of judicial 
remedies, but by making breach practically impossible. The smart 
contract is not merely an accessory added to the end of the contractual 
process to mitigate the risk of breach. 
Raskin’s analogy between smart contracts and starter interrupters 
breaks down on closer examination. The starter interrupter is a 
mechanism introduced, after an agreement is reached, to enforce its 
terms; but, unlike smart contracts, this mechanism has nothing to do 
with the substance of the agreement. By contrast, a smart contract 
literally contains the terms of the agreement, transformed into 
machine-readable scripting code. The fact that the agreement is 
enforceable algorithmically, without the participation of legal 
institutions, is a commitment represented in the smart contract. Thus, 
the self-help model paints too limited a picture of smart contracts. 
At the same time, the self-help model is too expansive. This 
analogy attributes functions to smart contracts that they do not actually 
perform; the smart contract itself does not perform the breach-limiting 
action, the blockchain and its computing nodes do. In the self-help 
model, by contrast, one party enforces the agreement consistent with, 
but outside the legal machinery of contract law. The smart contract is a 
component of a larger smart contract system, which ensures that, for 
example, the cryptocurrency tokens are transferred according to the 
contractual terms. Just as the state’s ex post remediation role 
distinguishes a legal contract from an informal exchange of promises,165 
 
 164. Raskin’s proposed solution to the possibility of illegal smart contracts is to suggest that 
some forms of smart contracts be prohibited through regulation. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 
340. This begs practical questions about enforcement. Smart contract platforms on public 
blockchains, such as Ethereum and Bitcoin, are open-source software adopted voluntarily by 
networks of mining node operators. There is not a central smart contract administrator to 
regulate. And the fact that identity on the blockchain generally takes the form of digital signatures 
rather than real names means it may not be feasible even to identify the counterparty who created 
an undesirable smart contract. 
 165. See infra Part III.C. 
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the integration of specific contractual terms and a general enforcement 
infrastructure makes a smart contract smart. The distributed ledger 
software both instantiates the contractual terms and enforces the 
contractual obligations. These functions are distinguishable, but 
necessarily connected. 
3. Smart Contracts as Entire Agreements.  Both the escrow model 
and the self-help model explain smart contracts as technical 
mechanisms overlaid on the basic contractual process. Escrow does so 
to facilitate performance, while self-help provides a remedy for 
nonperformance. These tools may reduce transaction costs and 
thereby make contracting more efficient. They are not, however, 
strictly necessary to the outcome. Neither fully captures the essence of 
smart contracts, because both treat smart contracts as external 
enhancements to the contractual process. The distinctive aspect of 
smart contracts is not that they make enforcement easier, it is that they 
make enforcement unavoidable. In order to do so, they change the 
nature of the contract itself. 
In Szabo’s vending machine example, the physical security of the 
device is sufficient to make breach less attractive than compliance.166 
But alongside physical security, another element is at work in Szabo’s 
example. The vending machine takes cash, which is a bearer 
instrument. Once the coins or bills are in belly of the machine, value 
has been transferred. No third parties need to be brought into the 
process to facilitate or secure the exchange. Szabo’s example does not 
easily translate to other payment mechanisms, like checks or credit 
cards, which require a bank to validate the transaction. This step 
introduces transaction costs and delay, and it means the contracting 
process is no longer contained within the hardware and software of the 
vending machine. And, intermediary validation potentially changes the 
performance equation. The consumer can breach the agreement by 
instructing the bank to reverse the charge, even after receiving the 
product. At that point, the smart contract would no longer govern the 
relationship between the parties. 
Cash works for a vending machine, but not for complex financial 
derivatives transactions, international supply chains, or major 
crowdfunding initiatives. Only a limited subset of transactions are 
sufficiently localized, low value, and low velocity for cash to be a viable 
 
 166. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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option.167 For this reason, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are very 
important for the growth of smart contracts. Bitcoin tokens are digital 
bearer instruments, functionally equivalent to cash, yet flexible and 
scalable in the manner of credit cards. A blockchain-based smart 
contract, like a cash transaction, therefore involves the complete 
exchange of value. 
If I buy an e-book for my Kindle on Amazon.com, a complete 
transfer of value does not occur immediately. When I click the “buy” 
button, the company’s computers transfer the e-book to my device, 
with associated digital rights to prevent additional copying, and they 
also process my credit card and debit my account. Yet, I am in a 
position to prevent a complete transfer of value, because I can still ask 
Amazon for a refund, or dispute the charge with the credit card 
company. This is possible because my contract with Amazon is 
executory—I have traded the e-book for the promise to pay my credit 
card issuer. Imagining the same exchange with a smart contract, by 
contrast, it is as though when I click the buy button, a drone picks up a 
stack of one-dollar bills from my house and flies them to Amazon. The 
contract fully executes with no human intervention. I can still dispute 
the transaction with Amazon, but now the contract is fully executed. 
Amazon has the cash; I am now asking them to return the money, 
rather than preventing them from receiving it. 
Because the exchange of value is entirely contained in the smart 
contract environment, there is no need to look anywhere else. In other 
words, the contract is the scripting code that tells the network what to 
transfer and when. In the Amazon example, the site’s computer system 
transfers the e-book and processes my credit card. Those machine 
instructions, however, are separate from my contract with Amazon, 
agreeing to exchange my payment information for a particular e-
book.168 If Amazon’s programmers make an error and send me an 
entirely different e-book, there is no question that my contract with 
 
 167. Or, they are transactions the parties do not want traced because they are somehow illicit. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the major early uses of Bitcoin was for illegal transactions. See Joshuah 
Bearman, The Rise and Fall of Silk Road: Part II, WIRED (May 2015), http://www.wired.com/ 
2015/05/silk-road-2 [http://perma.cc/4BCZ-LTBG] (recounting the story of a Bitcoin exchange 
commonly used for drug sales and other illegal activity); Joshuah Bearman, The Rise and Fall of 
Silk Road: Part I, WIRED (Apr. 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1 [http://perma.cc/ 
6BKF-BKY7] (same). 
 168. There may be questions about what constitutes that contract. Perhaps it is a combination 
of what I saw on the shopping cart screen and Amazon’s Terms of Service, or perhaps some 
judicial gap filling is required. Under no circumstances, however, is the contract exclusively the 
software code executed on Amazon’s servers. 
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Amazon controls, rather than the software code the computer system 
uses to effectuate the contract. 
For the smart contract, in contrast, everything beyond the code is 
just commentary. The code is a necessary part of the agreement itself, 
whereas Amazon’s software code is just a tool to execute the human-
made contract. For example, imagine that at the same time I place my 
order for the e-book on Amazon’s website, I type up a written 
agreement for a different book and send it to an Amazon customer 
service agent, who countersigns it. In the event of a dispute, there 
would be an evidentiary question as to which version of the agreement 
controlled. In the smart contract context, such an inquiry would be 
meaningless. The smart contract has the entire life of the contract 
immutably embedded into its code, which leaves no room for a 
separate written agreement to specify the parties’ intent. If a court 
concludes that some writing better reflects the parties’ meeting of the 
minds, it would be powerless to invalidate the smart contract; it would 
have to find some way to reverse the transfer of value ex post. 
The notion that smart contracts can supersede legal enforcement 
has been tested in the real world.169 A group of developers associated 
with Ethereum created a distributed crowdfunding system in mid-2016 
called “The DAO.”170 It was designed to implement the concept of 
DAO, in which corporate governance and operations are conducted 
automatically through smart contracts.171 Users pledged Ether (the 
Ethereum cryptocurrency) in return for tokens that gave them 
authority to vote on projects to fund. Organizations seeking funding 
would sign up through another interface, and collect Ether if they 
received sufficient votes. Despite the novelty of the arrangement, 
Ethereum users pledged over $150 million in Ether in a matter of 
weeks after The DAO launched.172 
Users signed up to participate in The DAO on a website that 
stated explicitly, in its terms of service, that the smart contract on the 
 
 169. We note that whether smart contracts can displace contractual enforcement is a different 
question than whether, as we consider in Part III, they can displace contract law. 
 170. Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance 
(unpublished manuscript), https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf [http:// perma.
cc/SE35-Y8CC]. 
 171. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 172. Nathaniel Popper, A Venture Fund With Plenty of Virtual Capital, but No Capitalist, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/business/dealbook/crypto-ether-
bitcoin-currency.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2GP2-H9N7]. 
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Ethereum blockchain was the controlling legal authority.173 Any 
human-readable documents or explanations, including those on the 
website, were “merely offered for educational purposes and do not 
supercede [sic] or modify the express terms of The DAO’s code set 
forth on the blockchain.”174 
Within weeks of launch, something went wrong. A hacker took 
advantage of a bug in The DAO’s code to siphon off over $60 million 
worth of Ether.175 Although clearly an attempt at theft, the hack was 
executed through a series of smart contracts that were formally valid 
within the rules of The DAO. Even though the stolen funds were 
temporarily quarantined in an account, and not immediately disbursed, 
from the perspective of the smart contracting system, the transactions 
were perfectly legitimate. Even if a court ordered the funds returned, 
there was no one to carry out that order. Thus, there was no legal or 
technical way to recover them without undermining the entire system. 
Ultimately, the leaders of Ethereum project had to convince a majority 
of mining nodes to implement a “hard fork,” which split the entire 
Ethereum blockchain into two incompatible paths.176 Only through this 
dramatic step, which effectively killed off The DAO and undermined 
confidence in the Ethereum platform, could the stolen funds be 
returned.177 
 
 173. The DAO’s original terms of service page, which was located at 
https://daohub.org/explainer.html, has been removed from the Web. For a contemporaneous 
quotation of the relevant language on the site, see Joel Ditz, DAOs, Hacks and the Law, MEDIUM 
(June 17, 2016), https://medium.com/@Swarm/daos-hacks-and-the-law-eb6a33808e3e [https://
perma.cc/N9M5-F2GT].  
 174. Id. 
 175. Michael del Castillo, The DAO Attacked: Code Issue Leads to $60 Million Ether Theft, 
COINDESK (June 17, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/dao-attacked-code-issue-leads-60-
million-ether-theft/ [https://perma.cc/3P4G-59MZ]; Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More than 
$50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-
50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/5NBQ-CFFN]. 
The varying valuations of the hack are due to the floating exchange rate between Ether and 
dollars. 
 176. Miners of one chain do not recognize the validity of blocks mined by the other clients, 
and vice versa, even though they may otherwise use exactly the same protocols. See Joseph 
Bonneau et al., Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies, IEEE 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 104, 113 (May 18, 2015), http://www.ieee-
security.org/TC/SP2015/papers-archived/6949a104.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWM8-MQZC]. 
 177. See Frances Coppola, A Painful Lesson for the Ethereum Community, FORBES (July 21, 
2016, 1:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2016/07/21/a-painful-lesson-for-the-
ethereum-community/#56d3a488bb24l [https://perma.cc/FRP2-7TDR]. The hard fork was 
considered a “nuclear option” because it was not just a reversal of transactions by the operator of 
The DAO; it broke the fundamental immutability of transactions on the Ethereum blockchain. 
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The DAO example shows the power of smart contracts, and also 
their limitations. Smart contracts seemed to be able to replace the legal 
system as an enforcement mechanism for The DAO users’ contractual 
relationship with the crowdfunding system. However, doing so came at 
a significant cost. Because the only enforcement mechanism was the 
Ethereum network’s computers executing the terms of The DAO 
software code, there was no way to distinguish between a legitimate 
string of transactions and one with malicious intent. 
III.  WHAT THEY TEACH US ABOUT CONTRACT LAW 
As we have discussed, there are reasons to be skeptical about 
whether smart contracts can deliver all the hoped-for gains in efficiency 
and flexibility. But there is a much deeper, more theoretical reason to 
be skeptical of smart contracts. Even if the technology could deliver all 
that its proponents promise, it is not clear whether its implementation 
would be an improvement over courts or simply orthogonal. Put 
simply, the question is whether smart contracts could do what courts 
do, only better. We think not. Although we can see why some conclude 
otherwise, we think that contract litigation plays a role in our social 
system that smart contracts do not even purport to replicate. 
Ostensibly, smart contracts remove the role of courts as 
enforcement agents. One might say that the contract enforces itself, or 
that the code itself enforces it. This means that parties no longer have 
the escape hatch of litigation. Once the smart contract is made, the 
machinery for its execution is unavoidably set in motion, ending the 
parties’ opportunity to affect the transaction ex post.178 This may be a 
bit of an overstatement. Parties can use multisig, for example, to 
 
See Joon Ian Wong & Ian Kar, Everything You Need to Know About the Ethereum “Hard Fork,” 
QUARTZ (July 18, 2016), https://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-
ethereum-hard-fork/ [https://perma.cc/B6DA-XC2L] (“If contracts held to be inviolable can 
effectively be overturned by a collective decision to run new software, what guarantee do financial 
institutions have that their transactions and funds are secure?”). A faction of the Ethereum 
community considered this such a breach of trust that it began mining the deprecated chain on 
which The DAO hack was not reversed, creating a duplicate token called Ethereum Classic. See 
David Z. Morris, The Bizarre Fallout of Etherum’s Epic Fail, FORTUNE (Sept. 4, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/09/04/ethereum-fall-out [https://perma.cc/ZK78-NCJX]. Broader 
questions about the legal or governance relationships among users, smart contract applications 
such as The DAO, and blockchain platforms such as Ethereum are beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally Werbach, supra note 17 (discussing the governance implications of The 
DAO fiasco in connection with the trust architecture of the blockchain). 
 178. Note that this is consistent with the regular aim of business agreements to try to dictate 
remedies ex ante; for example, clauses pertaining to mandatory arbitration, choice of law/forum, 
disclaimer of incidental/consequential damages, among others. 
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maintain some control over the execution of the contract.179 And in 
extreme cases such as The DAO hack, the entire blockchain could 
conceivably be forked if enough network nodes agreed.180 Still, if smart 
contracts are to be a disruptive force in contracting, this potential turns 
on the ability to eliminate the possibility of breach and the resultant 
litigation to enforce. 
Does this mean that smart contracts can replace courts in the 
adjudication of contract cases?181 Courts, it might be argued, serve the 
function of enforcing contractual obligations. But, because courts serve 
this function in a costly and time-consuming way, technological 
advancement offers the possibility of making courts obsolete; 
surpassed by mechanisms that can enforce obligations, and serve the 
same function, with greater efficiency and customization. 
Smart contracts thus offer a window into thinking about contract 
law at a theoretical level. Even if one were uninterested in the 
technology, smart contracts could illuminate foundational issues in the 
theory of contract. Their theoretical possibility, whether the 
technology can deliver or not, raises a pointed question about what 
function courts play when they adjudicate a contract case. Put another 
way, the basic question about whether smart contracts do what courts 
do, only better, introduces a reciprocal question about contract law 
more generally: Does contract law do what smart contracts aim to do? 
Taking smart contracts seriously is therefore a fruitful way to examine 
the function of courts and contract law. 
In order to answer the question whether smart contracts can do 
what courts do, this Section describes three competing conceptions of 
what role courts play—or ought to play—in contract cases. Each view 
informs how its proponents think that smart contracts might interact 
with contract law. Ultimately, we argue that through the correct 
understanding of contract law, it is clear that smart contracts cannot 
supplant the role that courts play. Smart contracts are not, even 
conceptually, a replacement for judicial contract adjudication. 
Our argument in this Section is bidirectional. Insofar as many 
readers may already intuitively grasp that smart contracts can, at best, 
avoid courts but cannot substitute for them, this Section provides the 
argument and reasoning to support that understanding. 
 
 179. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 62–63. 
 180. See supra note 175. 
 181. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
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A. Contract Law as Enforcing Promises 
According to one view, contract law provides legal enforcement 
for promises.182 When a promisor makes a commitment to a promisee, 
this commitment, the promise, generates an obligation to do the thing 
promised.183 Even without contract law, a moral obligation is created 
when one party makes a promise to another. While the exact source of 
this moral obligation is subject of philosophical dispute, there is little 
doubt that promises generate obligations.184 Contract law, the 
argument goes, serves to strengthen and support these moral 
obligations by creating corresponding legal obligations. At its core, 
contract law binds promisors, not simply morally, but also legally. 
The paradigmatic articulation of the view that contract law 
enforces promises is Charles Fried’s 1981 book, Contract as Promise.185 
For Fried, the capacity to make promises is a form of freedom, allowing 
parties to bind themselves and thus shape their obligations.186 By 
enforcing such voluntarily assumed obligations, the state supports the 
freedom of contracting parties.187 The core idea is that contracts are 
binding, as the self-imposed obligations of contracting parties. 
Contracts, like promises, are the result of voluntary acts performed 
with the intent to place the actor under an obligation. The ability to 
bind oneself in this way—to assume an obligation voluntarily—is itself 
a form of freedom. But one need not share Fried’s account of 
 
 182. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981) (grounding contract law in the morality of promises). 
 183. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“By promising we transform a choice that was morally neutral into one 
that is morally compelled.”). 
 184. Theoretical debate exits between convention-based views and reliance-based views. 
Conventionalist accounts understand promises as social conventions and understand their 
obligations as arising from the fact that failing to keep one’s promise would do violence to a 
valuable social institution. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 524–25 
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1967). Fried’s account of contract law appeals to such a convention-based 
account of promises. FRIED, supra note 182, at 11–17. Convention-based accounts face a problem 
explaining the sense that promissory obligations are owed directly to the promisee, which can be 
explained better by appealing to the interests of the promisee. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE 
OWE TO EACH OTHER 295–327 (1998). For a picture of contract law built on such a reliance-
based account of promissory obligation, see generally Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1982) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). 
For further discussion of this philosophical debate, see generally WILLIAM VITEK, PROMISING 
(1993) and Niko Kolodny & R.J. Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
119 (2003). 
 185. FRIED, supra note 182, at 17–21.  
 186. Id. at 8. 
 187. Id. at 21. 
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promissory obligations in order to think that contract law’s purpose is 
to provide legal obligations that correspond to the moral obligations of 
promises.188 
The essential idea is that promises are an important part of human 
life, and that contract law supports promising by offering legal 
recognition and enforcement. Contract law layers legal obligation on 
top of our moral obligations in order to bolster them. By making it the 
case that a party must, legally, do what it has promised, we affirm that 
people ought to do what they promise, and we thereby affirm the 
institution of promising. The point of contract law, then, is to help 
ensure that people are truly bound by their promissory commitments. 
From this perspective, contract law might appear incrementally 
more successful the more it affirms that promisors must do as they have 
promised. In this light, elements of contract law that diverge from 
ensuring that parties keep their promises may seem troubling.189 
Particularly, it may appear problematic that contract law generally 
imposes only expectation damages, rather than specific performance.190 
Specific performance more closely matches our moral obligation to do 
the thing promised.191 Insofar as the point of contract law is to 
strengthen and affirm our moral obligations, and insofar as our moral 
obligations are to do as we have promised, then contract law should 
aim to align morality and legal obligation. 
If one holds this conception of contract law’s function, then smart 
contracts may seem like an appealing alternative to court-based 
contract law. Courts exert legal force upon us to do as we have 
promised, thus strengthening our voluntarily assumed commitments. 
But legal force is a relatively clumsy mechanism. If we want people to 
 
 188. See generally, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT 
LAW 86 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (defending a view of contract law based on the importance of 
providing assurance to another that promising allows); Daniel Markovits, Contract and 
Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004) (defending a view of contract law based on the 
community created between promisor and promisee).  
 189. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 708, 749 (2007) (noting the aim of “advanc[ing] an accommodationist approach that 
renders the norms of interpersonal morality relevant to the shape of law” and “deploy[ing] this 
approach to sound some alarms about the divergence of promise and contract, particularly with 
respect to contract’s remedial doctrines”). 
 190. Id. at 724 (“The law . . . fails to use its distinctive powers and modes of expression to 
mark the judgment that breach is impermissible as opposed to merely subject to a price.”). 
 191. Id. at 722 (“Contract law would run parallel to morality if contract law rendered the same 
assessments of permissibility and impermissibility as the moral perspective, except that it would 
replace moral permissibility with legal permissibility and it would use its distinctive tools and 
techniques to express those judgments.”). 
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do as they have promised, then a mechanism that automatically and 
completely ensures performance may look like a triumph, at least to 
the extent that it does not come at the expense of other freedoms.192 
Smart contracts, according to this line of thought, are like specific 
performance on steroids and without the state’s coercive machinery. 
Smart contracts make it the case that promisors will do precisely what 
they promise, radically strengthening promises. If this is the point of 
judicial contract enforcement, then it looks like smart contracts offer a 
superior technology, and smart contracts would leave judicial 
enforcement essentially obsolete. 
Of course, there is room for concern within this picture of contract 
law as enforcing promises. First, one might suggest that smart 
contracts, by making performance inevitable, are no longer promises 
at all.193 If so, smart contracts would not reinforce the practice of 
promising. Whereas contract law supports promising by giving 
promisors legal reasons to perform, smart contracts do away with the 
need for reasons altogether, and fail to support the moral agency 
involved in promising. Pragmatically, it may not be obvious why we 
should value promising, apart from the reliable commitments that 
promising enables.194 But, assuming we should value promising for 
other reasons, then smart contracts highlight the fact that contract law 
 
 192. One reason to disfavor specific performance, even while recognizing that it would be 
preferable in terms of accurately corresponding with the underlying moral commitment, is that 
the coercion involved with implementing such a remedy would be too burdensome. This reason 
is often noted particularly with regard to personal service contracts. See, e.g., 12 ARTHUR LINTON 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 65.25 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2017) (1950) (“A second 
reason [against specific performance] is that we have a strong prejudice against any kind of 
involuntary personal servitude. We insist upon liberty even at the expense of broken promises.”). 
It is sometimes even suggested that specific performance might violate the constitutional 
prohibition on slavery, though the merits of this constitutional claim is questionable. See Nathan 
B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2020, 2025 
(2009).  
 193. One must be cautious not to overstate the point though. Smart contracts do require a 
voluntary act by the contracting agent at the outset. 
 194. In any event, a significant further argument would be needed here. It’s not transparent 
that a hypothetical world in which making a promise produced an unfailing compulsion to do the 
thing promised would be a morally impoverished world. If smart contracts make our world more 
like this, then they would not bolster agents’ choices to keep their promises. But it’s not clear why 
we should care about that. 
One obvious rationale for creating reasons, as opposed to action directly, would be to 
respect the freedom or agency of others. I can give you reasons to raise your right hand, but I 
ought not simply thrust your hand upwards. But this rationale does not apply in as straightforward 
a way when it is one’s own action, as contracting involves. If what I aim to do is to get myself to 
act, what I may seek is motivation rather than merely reasons. 
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is about creating or supporting reasons to fulfill our moral obligations, 
and not only about creating reliable consequences. 
Second, one might think that contract law is not only about 
supporting promises, but about the community or state being the entity 
lending support. On this view, it is essential that contract law 
strengthens promising through a political medium. In a contract case, 
we collectively express our affirmation of an obligation and lend our 
resources to enforcing that obligation.195 Smart contracts, by contrast, 
would strengthen promissory obligations without this state 
involvement. Of course, to their proponents, this is a key feature of 
smart contracts.196 But, to others, this might be a bug. Even though 
smart contracts would strengthen promises, it would be problematic 
that this strength fails to come from the political community. Smart 
contracts would thus raise worries similar to those expressed toward 
private arbitration or penalty clauses.197 That is, one might worry that 
something is lost simply by transferring the power away from the 
political community. 
Leaving aside worries like these, the general point is that if the 
function of contract law is to strengthen moral obligations to keep 
promises by adding legal coercion, then smart contracts seem well 
suited to supplant this function. In short, if contract law is about 
making people keep their promises, then smart contracts look like they 
can do that job even better than courts. 
 
 195. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and 
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 221 (2000) (“[T]he institution of contract is an 
institution in which the community assists people who make agreements by providing a measure 
of security in those agreements.”). 
 196. See Popper, supra note 49. 
 197. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“I do not 
believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment or should be 
institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It should be treated instead as a highly 
problematic technique for streamlining dockets.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: 
The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 411 (2016) (noting that remedial 
clauses are objectionable since they “displace the public’s role in determining the content of an 
important area of law and objectionably displace the judiciary’s role in providing fair and 
impartial judgments about the public significance of legal wrongs”). There is a significant 
difference for smart contracts, however. Arbitration and penalty clauses ultimately depend on 
judicial sanction, so that state power is ultimately at issue. Smart contracts, in contrast, do not 
implicate state authority in this way. So, whereas arbitration and penalty clauses necessarily 
implicate state power and thus arguably make the political community complicit in their results, 
it is harder to make such a case about smart contracts. 
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B. Contract Law as Voluntary Liability 
A second view of contract law conceives it as a method to create 
legal liability voluntarily, in a way that is not necessarily connected to 
morality or promising. According to this view, contractual obligations 
need not correspond to moral obligations.198 Instead, contractual 
obligations can be fashioned where it is in the interest of parties to 
create them. By creating legal liability, parties can create a distinctive 
obligation that can serve any number of purposes, from enhancing 
agency199 to facilitating efficient transactions.200 
There are three key elements in this second view. First, 
contracts—as opposed to promises—involve parties agreeing to legal 
liability if they fail to perform. The crucial element of contract law is 
that certain agreements are legally binding; that is, they are subject to 
agreed-upon legal sanctions for breach. But whether and how any 
agreement is legally binding is ultimately up to the parties.201 Rather 
than understanding legal liability as parasitic on existing moral 
obligations, this view sees legal liability as the elective creation of the 
parties involved. 
Second, the legal obligations of contract reflect parties opting into 
liability. Insofar as parties opt into a system of legal penalties, the legal 
obligations describe those actions to which a legal sanction will 
attach.202 Thus, by making it the case that a party will face a sanction 
 
 198. See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1603, 1617 (2009). As Professor Kraus explains:  
When a correspondence account insists on enforcing a promise made by a promisor 
who intended it not to be legally binding, it paradoxically purports to justify a legal 
obligation on the ground that it enforces a moral responsibility derived entirely from 
the individual’s free will, even though legally enforcing that obligation violates the will 
of the very same individual whose autonomy the moral obligation is supposed to 
vindicate. 
Id.; see also Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801, 809–10 (2008) 
(“The objection to the claim that contracts are promises, which I have been pressing, exploits the 
fact that at least some contractual undertakings generate nothing like the moral obligation to 
perform that attaches to the making of a binding promise.”).  
 199. See, e.g., Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 761 (2016) 
(“[C]ontract law aims to empower people to use promises as tools to influence one another’s 
actions and thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and interests.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of 
the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1266 (1980) (arguing that allowing people to bind 
themselves legally improves utility by shaping and encouraging promise-making activity). 
 201. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 319 
(1986) (offering a theory of contract in which “[c]ontractual enforcement . . . will usually reflect 
the will of the parties”). 
 202. On this view, it would be incoherent to imagine parties agreeing to create a legal 
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for failing to perform, that party thereby generates its own obligation 
to perform. 
Third, because contracting is about parties choosing to attach legal 
consequences to future actions, questions of contract law should 
address how to determine what the parties intended, or would have 
chosen, ex ante.203 The basic question is what the parties would want, 
perhaps subject to certain additional nuances.204 A range of contract 
doctrines can then be explained as default rules, presumed to be what 
most parties would want unless they explicitly indicate otherwise.205 
Contract law, then, is fundamentally about enabling transactional 
activity, by creating a system in which one can voluntarily bind oneself 
through opting into flexible and predictable consequences for breach. 
If this is what contract law does, then smart contracting again 
looks like it could supplant it. According to this second view, the 
fundamental purpose of contract law is allowing people to create 
reliable consequences, enabling them to shape their behavior. The 
essential feature of contracts is the communication of information 
about what will happen in the future.206 Efficient or agency-enhancing 
transactions can only take place if such communication is intelligible 
and trusted. 
Smart contracts offer the possibility of highly reliable 
 
obligation to ϕ and yet attaching no ex post legal consequences to a failure to ϕ. The legal 
obligation necessarily and completely reflects that fact that some consequence attaches. This does 
not mean that obligation and the consequences are one and the same. Any given obligation might 
have a range of legal consequences.  
 203. Cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 200, at 1264 (“It is important to emphasize that the proper 
focus here is on prospective effects, that future promising is the behavior to be influenced by the 
rules summarized above.”). 
 204. Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“We suggest that efficient defaults would 
take a variety of forms that at times would diverge from the ‘what the parties would have 
contracted for’ principle.”). 
 205. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 198, at 1648 (noting that “majoritarian default rules respect 
personal sovereignty—by maximizing the likely convergence between individuals’ promissory 
obligation and their subjective intent—and by increasing the benefits and reducing the costs of 
exercising the positive individual liberty to undertake self-imposed moral obligations”); cf. 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 263 (1985) 
(“Our framework departs from the conventional view that state-supplied contract clauses are 
means merely of reducing negotiating and other resource costs; it focuses instead on the value of 
implied terms as widely useful, predefined signals that reduce the incidence of certain identifiable 
types of formulation errors.”). 
 206. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 200, at 1267 (“[T]he promisor informs the promisee about 
the proposed future receipt of a benefit. The promise itself is merely the production of a piece of 
information about the future.”). 
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communication about future outcomes. This is true in two ways. First, 
because the agreed-upon result occurs automatically, uncertainty 
about performance, and about judicial recognition, disappears. A 
promisee no longer needs to wonder whether the promise will be kept, 
or whether a court will recognize the breach. Second, because the code 
is itself the contract, provisions are laid out in precise, operational 
terms by definition, to a heightened degree as compared to traditional 
contract language. 
In a well-functioning smart contract, the contract necessarily 
answers interpretive questions in determinative ways. In short, if 
contract law exists to facilitate reliance through the ability to opt into 
predictable future consequences, then smart contracts seem to serve 
this function even more seamlessly. If contract law is a commitment 
mechanism, then smart contracts seem to be a superior commitment 
mechanism. 
Again there is room for concern. Specifically, one might worry 
that the ex ante information costs to determine all contingencies could 
make smart contracting overly costly. While this is undoubtedly a 
significant concern, it is ultimately a practical rather than theoretical 
objection. If smart contracts came with an array of well-understood 
default rules,207 that could mitigate the ex ante information costs. To 
the extent that they persist, it would be a contingent matter to decide 
in what situations the information costs outweigh the gains in certainty. 
Smart contracts would, at least some of the time, be a better technology 
than ex post contract litigation. And this reflects the fact that, on this 
view, smart contracts and contract law serve the same underlying 
function. 
C. Contract Law as Ex Post Adjudication 
We believe that smart contracts are not, even theoretically, a 
substitute for contract law. Consequently, we believe that the above 
views about contract law’s function, which appear to suggest that smart 
contracts could replace contract law, are unsatisfactory. These two 
arguments are mutually reinforcing: one can see the 
incommensurability of smart contracts and contract litigation by 
attending to the true function of contract law; and one can see the 
inadequacy of the above views about contract law by attending to the 
way in which smart contracts cannot serve the same function as 
 
 207. Presumably part of any smart contracting platform—and much of what competing 
platforms might compete over—would be supposedly majoritarian and efficient default rules.  
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contract law. 
Both views of contract law described thus far assume an ex ante 
perspective that focuses on how contract law shapes our deliberations 
and motivations. That is, for both views, contract law is about giving us 
reasons to act. On the first view, contract law shapes our deliberation 
by supplementing our moral obligations with corresponding legal 
obligations. As such, contract law gives us an additional legal 
consideration in favor of keeping our promises. On the second view, 
contract law allows us to generate obligations that will shape our 
deliberations going forward, by electing to impose liability for some 
actions. As such, contract law creates motivations to comply, which 
need not correspond with our moral reasons, through the imposition of 
potential legal liability. 
If one holds the second, motivation-creating view of contract law, 
then it is natural to see smart contracts as supplanting contract law. 
After all, why create motives for action when one can ensure the action 
itself?208 If contract law is about facilitating our actions going forward, 
then the smart contract seems like an appealing innovation. 
But that is not what contract law is about. Contract law does not 
exist to alter our reasons going forward—though it surely does that. 
Rather, it exists to adjudicate the justice of a situation ex post.209 It is 
backward looking. Its basic function is to decide whether one party has 
wronged another party by failing to perform a promised action. That 
is, contract law is a fundamentally remedial institution, not aimed at 
creating new reasons to perform, but aimed at resolving disputes, 
taking those reasons as already given. One can see this backward-
looking, remedial character in the way that contract law waits for 
breach, waits for an aggrieved party to bring forward a complaint, and 
even then rarely orders conduct.210 We suggest that contract law is not 
about creating forward-looking reasons, because other mechanisms 
might serve that purpose equally or better. 
 
 208. The same thing might be said about creating reasons for action, see Shiffrin, supra note 
189, at 749, but there are significantly more questions here. It may be that there is a value to an 
institution that creates reasons—causes a certain kind of normative engagement—apart from its 
ability to create motivation. We leave that possibility very open. But, if so, then this again 
highlights the inability of smart contracts to supplant contract law. 
 209. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor 
to perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from [the] 
breach.”).  
 210. See generally Cornell, supra note 19 (arguing that rather than enforcing promises and 
their obligations, contract law enforces complaints against promissory wrongs). 
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A simple example can illustrate the differences between the three 
views. Suppose Abby promises Bob that she will pay him back the 
money that he is considering lending to her. By promising, Abby 
creates a moral obligation. She now has a special sort of reason to pay 
the money back. These points about obligation and reasons are true 
independent of the law. What might contract law add? On one view, it 
might add an additional obligation—a legal obligation—that 
corresponds with the moral obligation. So, Abby’s moral reasons to 
pay the money back would now be bolstered by parallel legal reasons 
or legal motivations. On another view, contract law might add an 
option for an additional liability. By promising, Abby has subjected 
herself to moral responsibility, and in doing so, she has created reasons 
to perform by opening herself up to moral sanctions. In addition, 
contract law allows her, if she would like, to subject herself to even 
more accountability—legal accountability. Thus, she could create 
more, or different, motivations to perform by opening herself up to a 
new set of sanctions. The difference between these two views is that on 
the first, but not the second, the legal obligations correspond with the 
moral obligations. But, according to both answers, contract law adds 
additional obligations and thus additional motivation to pay Bob back. 
But an altogether different answer about what contract law adds 
is the view that contract law creates a forum to determine what happens 
if Abby does not perform.211 On this view, contract law does not change 
anything about Abby’s obligations. Those were complete the moment 
that she promised—she has reason to pay the money back because she 
promised to pay the money back.212 Contract law did not make it that 
case that Abby had to do anything; Abby herself made it the case that 
she had to do something. Contract law adds something ex post to deal 
with failure. It is not about ensuring that she performs, but about 
responding if she does not. Contract law enables an avenue for Bob to 
 
 211. This idea appears to be an element of recent civil recourse theory. See generally Nathan 
B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 529 (2011) (noting that contract law helps facilitate social welfare by holding individuals 
accountable without the need for recourse to private violence); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil 
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) (arguing that contract law is a form of 
corrective justice designed to make aggrieved parties whole). One need not accept all aspects of 
current civil recourse theory to maintain that contract law is not fundamentally about the creation 
of reasons ex ante. 
 212. Of course, this reason may have certain special characteristics—in particular, it may be 
content-independent and it may be exclusionary. See JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35 
(1986) (“A reason is content-independent if there is no direct connection between the reason and 
the action for which it is a reason.”). 
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complain if Abby does not fulfill her obligations. 
One might think that this avenue for complaint feeds back into the 
reasons that Abby has to perform. And, in a way, that is true. Abby 
does get a reason to perform from contract law—specifically, she will 
be liable to a complaint from Bob if she does not. But that is an indirect, 
independently empty reason, because it is a new reflection of the 
reason that she already had. It would be almost absurdly circuitous to 
think that contract law’s primary function was about shaping reasons 
in such a redundant way. It is much more straightforward to see 
contract law as fundamentally about adjudicating the wrongs of broken 
agreements, and the function of creating reason or motivation as 
incidental. 
When one views contract law in this way, then it is apparent that 
smart contracting does not even purport to do what contract law does. 
The two have fundamentally different objectives. Smart contracting 
functions to ensure action. Contract law functions to recognize and 
remedy grievances. Smart contracts could not—even in theory—
replace contract law. At best, smart contracts might reduce the need 
for contract litigation. But that would not mean that smart contracts 
serve the same function in a superior fashion.213 Rather, shifting to 
smart contracts would mean a shift to an altogether different mode of 
interaction, and one not clearly superior. 
IV.  SMART CONTRACTS IN PRACTICE 
If smart contracts do something fundamentally different than 
contract law, does that mean legal scholars can safely ignore them? 
Perhaps it was all just a misunderstanding, borne out of Szabo’s 
unfortunate choice of terminology two decades ago. If he had called 
his idea “intelligent agents” or “virtual vending machines,” perhaps 
there would be no reason to examine the legal implications further, but 
we believe there are still reasons. Our conclusion, that smart contracts 
are orthogonal to contract law, does not end the inquiry. Smart 
contracts will be used in situations otherwise subject to contract, and 
will still be nominally subject to contract law. Problems are likely to 
 
 213. To think otherwise would be like thinking that text messaging supplants the function of 
reading facial expressions insofar as the complete adoption of the former might make the latter 
unnecessary. Cf. Jeffrey Kluger, We Never Talk Anymore: The Problem with Text Messaging, 
TIME (Aug. 16, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/08/16/we-never-talk-anymore-the-problem-
with-text-messaging/ [https://perma.cc/AGN6-AVAG ] (“Habitual texters . . . don’t get to 
practice the art of interpreting nonverbal visual cues.”). 
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arise. These in turn will produce responses with real consequences, 
both for the parties involved, and for the development of contract law. 
Proponents of smart contracts argue they will eliminate the 
friction of legal disputes.214 This view is overly optimistic.215 While the 
potential benefits of smart contracts are substantial, the potential 
problems are significant as well. There is a Frankenstein dimension to 
a smart contract: an instrument that fuses something innately human, 
entering into and enforcing agreements, with something mechanical, 
derived from scientific experiments. Science fiction authors since Mary 
Shelley have warned of the consequences of such cyborgs.216 Perhaps 
the benefits of smart contracts will exceed the costs. Perhaps the 
benefits can be magnified, or the costs minimized. We should, 
nonetheless, carefully assess both sides of the ledger. 
Contract law is, of course, far from perfect. Yet by switching from 
the ex post adjudication of contract to the ex ante reduction of 
agreements to software code, smart contracts will in some cases merely 
shift problems rather than eliminate them. Smart contracts are likely 
to face two kinds of problems, practical and doctrinal. These difficulties 
will create pressure for responses. Some traditional solutions can be 
grafted onto the technical apparatus with limited disruption. Others, 
however, will involve reintroduction of law. They may even lead to 
greater regulatory involvement in contract. 
 
 214. See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 8, at 109 (“[T]hrough smart contracts . . . 
[c]ompanies can program relationships with radical transparency . . . . And overall, like it or not, 
they must conduct business in a way that is considerate of the interests of other parties. The 
platform demands it.”); Cassano, supra note 93 (“Someday, these programs may replace lawyers 
. . . .”); Andrew Keys, Memo from Davos: We Have a Trust Problem. Personal Responsibility and 
Ethereum Are the Solutions, CONSENSYS BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), https://media.consensys.net/ 
memo-from-davos-we-have-a-trust-problem-personal-responsibility-and-ethereum-are-the-
solutions-19d1104946d8#.c46zvkcks [https://perma.cc/4AQC-T4SW ] (“It is early days, and there 
will surely be the need of attorneys, auditors, and regulators to learn, educate and facilitate smart 
contracts, but the process will become much more automated, intermediaries will be removed and 
the cost of trust will plummet.”).  
 215. How widespread litigation will be is an open question. There is also the question of 
whether aggrieved parties in smart contract arrangements can effectively litigate. As with any 
transactions on a blockchain, smart contracts designate parties based on cryptographic signatures. 
The counterparty may be anonymous, or in a different jurisdiction.  
 216. See generally MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN, OR, THE MODERN 
PROMETHEUS (1818) (highlighting the dangers that result from creating a new being). Cf. Andrea 
M. Matwyshyn, Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 573 passim 
(2010) (describing firms in the securities industry increasingly dependent on information 
technology as “corporate cyborgs”). 
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A. Imperfections of Algorithmic Enforcement 
There are significant practical limitations in replacing human 
enforcement of agreements with software running on the blockchain. 
Things simply do not always go according to plan.217 Anyone who has 
seen an error code on their computer knows that sophisticated 
software-based systems are imperfect. Even if the underlying 
blockchain consensus mechanisms are reliable, the smart contract 
applications running on top of them may not be.218 The failure of The 
DAO should be a cautionary note for smart contract developers.219 
Even without bugs, there are reasons to doubt smart contracts will 
always operate as desired. First, they require reduction of human-
readable language to machine-readable code. This limits their scope to 
those subjects and activities that can readily be specified.220 For 
example, a contract to unlock my connected car upon presentation of 
a certain cryptographic key can easily be encoded through a 
programming language such as Ethereum’s Solidity. The network 
address for the car lock, the desired key, and the action to be taken, are 
all subject to precise definition. At the other extreme, some contractual 
terms simply cannot be expressed through formal logic, because they 
imply human judgment. A machine has no precise way to assess 
whether a party used “best efforts,” for example.221 
 
 217. See Scholz, supra note 33 (“First, the use of algorithms to determine terms in a contract 
creates the possibility for emergence, that is, results that are not and indeed could not be foreseen 
by the algorithm’s creator. This creates situations where the entity responsible for the algorithm 
does not know how it works and cannot predict its behavior.”). 
 218. Peter Vessenes, cofounder of the Bitcoin Foundation, reviewed publically available 
Ethereum smart contracts and estimated there were 100 errors per 1000 lines of software code. 
See Peter Vessenes, Ethereum Contracts Are Going To Be Candy for Hackers, VESSENES (May 
18, 2016), http://vessenes.com/ethereum-contracts-are-going-to-be-candy-for-hackers/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6ARK-9NGV]. Even for commercial software, the industry average is as high as 25 
errors per 1000 lines of code. See STEVE MCCONNELL, CODE COMPLETE: A PRACTICAL 
HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE CONSTRUCTION 521 (2d ed. 2004). 
 219. See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Surden, supra note 15, at 682–83. 
 221. A computable or smart contract could be encoded with an algorithm to evaluate such 
imprecise terms. Human courts and juries often use proxies, formulas, or framing mechanisms to 
evaluate concepts such as reasonableness or best efforts. At best, however, this reduces but does 
not eliminate the grey areas around imprecise terms. And even when it offers a precise answer, 
something is lost in the process in the conversion from analog to digital.  
The other way smart contracts can address non-machine-encodable terms is to reintroduce 
humans. The oracles that the smart contract code references to assess performance may be 
powered by people rather than just reporting facts in the world. Or the smart contract may 
incorporate an arbitrator who can resolve uncertain cases in favor of one party or the other 
through the multisig mechanism. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. At some point, 
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Building a computerized system able to interpret smart contracts 
like humans can is effectively a challenge for artificial intelligence.222 
And that challenge is unlikely to be solved any time soon.223 Despite 
great advances in machine learning, computers do not have the degree 
of contextual, domain-specific, subtle understanding required to 
resolve contractual ambiguity. In this regard, smart contract platforms 
like Ethereum are also vastly less sophisticated than state-of-the-art 
artificial intelligence systems like IBM’s Watson. 
Even if the smart contract operates exactly as designed, it may 
produce suboptimal results, either in the minds of one or both parties, 
or as a matter of economic efficiency, because it is fixed. Sometimes, 
for example, nonperformance is the desirable outcome. Much has been 
made of the idea of efficient breach.224 If a builder contracts with a 
carpenter to make custom woodwork for a new home, but notifies the 
carpenter that the home will not be built before initiation of that work, 
nonperformance and compensation to the carpenter may be the best 
result. One interpretation is that contract law is designed to facilitate 
such nonperformance, assuming the legal default rules for contractual 
remedies stood behind the parties’ negotiation.225 But, one need not 
accept the theory that the law sanctions efficient breach to appreciate 
that the law does not lock parties into performance.226 
 
however, doing so transforms the smart contract into a conventional contract with an arbitration 
clause, eliminating the alleged benefits of the approach. 
 222. Steve Omohundro, Cryptocurrencies, Smart Contracts, and Artificial Intelligence, 1 AI 





 223. “The conventional view has been that the automation of contract monitoring or 
compliance is beyond the capability of contemporary technology.” Surden, supra note 15, at 632 
(citing ENRICO FRANCESCONI, SIMONETTA MONTEMAGNI & WIM PETERS, SEMANTIC 
PROCESSING OF LEGAL TEXTS: WHERE THE LANGUAGE OF LAW MEETS THE LAW OF 
LANGUAGE 60–62 (2010)); Symposium, Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence: How 
Computers Think Like Lawyers, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 19 (2001). 
 224. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13–14 (1998); Robert L. 
Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is 
able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have 
occupied had performance been rendered.”). 
 225. See Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 452 (2006) 
(“[B]reach could be immoral or moral. To know which is the case, we have to inspect the reasons 
for breach and the knowledge of the party committing breach.”).  
 226. See Cornell, supra note 19, at 1175 (“Contract law does not offer a norm against breach 
of contract. This is not—as the theory of efficient breach would suggest—because contract law 
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The general lesson is that facts may change between the ex ante 
specification of contract rights and the ex post adjudication of legal 
effects. Parties to smart contracts can try to hedge against such changes 
by incorporating qualifying language or force majeur clauses, but those 
kinds of imprecise terms are difficult to specify in computer code. In 
other cases, parties may wish to advantageously alter a contract prior 
to performance. Under standard contract law, such modifications are 
unproblematic.227 For smart contracts, such modifications pose a 
difficulty. Upon agreement, a smart contract is locked in place and 
secured by pledged cryptocurrency. To enable an intermediate step 
before execution, the smart contract code would need to incorporate 
the possibility of modification explicitly. As a technical matter, this 
would increase the complexity of the process. It would also introduce 
the kinds of difficulties already described about how to express 
complex ideas in code, like when and how parties can modify the set 
terms of a smart contract. 
As the literature on relational contracts recognizes, contracts are 
often more than a one-time interaction between parties, followed by 
performance or judicial resolution of a dispute.228 Instead, contracts are 
elements of ongoing relationships.229 Both the parties and the courts 
view the contract in light of social and relational norms. Ex ante, 
parties to a relational contract must anticipate later renegotiation, and 
ex post, courts must determine how to fill gaps in the agreed-upon 
contract.230 Smart contracts attempt to atomize the contractual process. 
They formally strip away the time dimension of interactions between 
the parties, and the uncertainties of future judicial resolution. Yet, 
smart contracts bind real people, who have real relationships, and their 
performance unfolds over time. This makes it impossible to avoid some 
of the messiness that attends traditional contracts. 
B. Doctrinal Concerns 
Contract law developed over centuries to account for situations 
that arise in the execution of agreements. Through the inductive 
 
judges breach of contract permissible when the costs are high enough. Contract law simply does 
not determine permissibility.”). 
 227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 228. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 900–01 (1978). 
 229. See, e.g., Macauley, supra note 91. 
 230. See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000). 
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process of the common law, courts evolved solutions to novel 
problems. Upon closer examination, many of these rules are in tension 
with smart contracts’ mechanism of automatic, irrevocable 
enforcement. 
At a basic level, a smart contract can meet the legal requirements 
for a valid and enforceable common law contract: offer, acceptance, 
consideration, capacity, and legality.231 But a host of potential problems 
lurk beneath the surface. At virtually every turn, smart contracts might 
operate in ways contrary to legal contracts. That is, although smart 
contracts may be legal contracts, they may also fall victim to almost 
every legal deficiency. Nothing in a smart contract ensures a true 
meeting of the minds; nothing ensures consideration; and so on. Below, 
we describe a number of ways that smart contracts might operate 
problematically, and contrary to the law of contracts.232 
1. Problems with Meeting of the Minds.  A smart contract is 
computer code representing an agreement between two or more 
parties, so one question might be whether it truly represents a meeting 
of the minds. Computers, after all, do not have minds, at least not 
outside the realm of science fiction. But this objection is quickly 
overcome. In modern contract law, offer and acceptance are evaluated 
objectively;233 that is, we allow evidence that both parties intend to be 
bound, and discard evidence about indicia of internal mental states. 
The fact that parties submit their cryptographic private keys to commit 
their resources to the smart contract is proof of such an intent. 
The parties’ mutual intent to be bound does not, however, prove 
a meeting of the minds about the specific contractual provisions. The 
doctrine of mutual mistake excuses performance when both parties 
were mistaken about an essential fact.234 If the smart contract refers to 
cotton delivered by the ship Peerless but there are two—or 
 
 231. See, e.g., Cohn v. Fisher, 287 A.2d 222, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (“The 
essentials of a valid contract are: mutual assent, consideration, legality of object, capacity of the 
parties and formality of memorialization.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 17, 
71, 178–79 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 232. In all the cases below, it may be possible to write exceptions into the smart contract, or 
into the basic code of the underlying blockchain platform, to address these situations. See infra 
Part IV.C.1. Such mechanisms are likely to be imperfect, however, and will compromise the 
efficiency of fully automated smart contracts. They will not automatically apply to every smart 
contract like a common law doctrine or statutory provision in conventional contract law.  
 233. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20(1) & illus. 2, 152 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
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seventeen—ships of that name, standard contract law can hold the 
agreement unenforceable.235 But the smart contract would go ahead 
and execute.236 In a unilateral contract, the mistake might not even 
need to be mutual for a court to rescind it.237 In other words, there 
might be an executable smart contract that does not satisfy the legal 
conditions for mutual assent. This is because even seemingly ex ante 
elements of contract law, like assent, actually turn on how matters look 
ex post. 
The basic problem here is that smart contracts are not really smart, 
at least not in the way that contract law is smart. Smart contracts are 
not smart enough to adjust as events unfold. Even beyond mistakes, 
parties may not anticipate the exact scenario that arises at the time of 
performance. Most contracts are incomplete, in the sense that they do 
not specify an outcome for every possible state of the world.238 Courts 
can fill in the blanks when the contractual expression of the parties’ 
intent is unclear. With a smart contract, this approach is foreclosed. 
A second problem related to meeting of the minds arises when the 
contract itself is clear, but does not represent the intent of the parties, 
for example, if a party enters into an agreement due to fraud or duress. 
In such a situation, performance may be excused.239 The contract itself 
is valid; it is simply not enforceable. Yet, the distinction between 
validity and enforceability is precisely the one that smart contracts 
elide. 
A smart contract is valid if it is accepted as part of the consensus 
process on the blockchain ledger. Once that happens, it is ineluctably 
enforced, even if fraudulently induced. The blockchain does not have 
 
 235. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 376 (Ex. 1864). For the fact that there were 
at least eleven ships called Peerless; see A. W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The 
Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 295 (1989). 
 236. Probably the smart contract would use whichever Peerless arrived first. If a multisig 
arbitration arrangement were built into the smart contract, the arbitrator could choose one 
option. However, the arbitrator would not have the ability, absent a specific contractual provision, 
to return the funds to both parties and recreate the ex ante status quo.  
 237. See, e.g., Conduit & Found. Corp. v. Atlantic City, 64 A.2d 382, 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1949) (“Quite plainly, this is a unilateral mistake in a contract for which equity may, under 
certain circumstances, grant relief by way of rescission.”); Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & 
Omaha R.R. v. Washburn Land Co., 161 N.W. 358, 361 (Wis. 1917) (“[E]quity will grant relief by 
rescission in proper cases for the mistake of one party as readily as for mutual mistake, where it 
is shown that it would be contrary to equity and against conscience to allow the enforcement of 
the contract.”). 
 238. See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 119, 123 (1998). 
 239. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
WERBACH & CORNELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2017 11:58 AM 
370  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:313 
any context regarding why parties provide private keys to authorize a 
smart contract, only that they did. And no one can ask an arbiter to 
excuse performance because she signed with a gun to her head, because 
there is no arbiter. The arbiters are the computers operating the 
blockchain, and they only listen to the code of the smart contracts 
themselves. 
As a practical matter, furthermore, the plaintiff in such a scenario 
would have difficulty asserting an affirmative cause of action. Duress 
itself is not a tort. And fraud is significantly different as a cause of 
action than as an affirmative defense.240 The most effective recourse for 
someone improperly induced to enter in a smart contract would likely 
be to sue for restitution of the ill-gotten gains, after the smart contract 
executes. 
2. Problems with Consideration.  Similar problems arise with 
consideration, another basic requirement for an enforceable contract. 
Consideration distinguishes contracts from unenforceable gifts.241 All 
promises may create moral duties, but not all promises create legal 
obligations. For smart contracts, there is no test for consideration. A 
typical smart contract involves some consideration that induces the 
reciprocal promise. However, there is nothing stopping someone from 
encoding a gift promise to the blockchain. Such a promise would 
execute irrevocably, in the same manner as any other smart contract. 
The rest of consideration doctrine, like the distinction between 
adequacy and sufficiency, similarly goes by the wayside when there is 
no way to test enforceability before execution.242 
The absence of consideration from smart contracts sheds further 
light on how they differ from legal contracts. Consideration doctrine 
supports the view that contract law exists to provide remedies for 
 
 240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, topic 1, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“Because tort law imposes liability in damages for misrepresentation . . . the requirements 
imposed by contract law are in some instances less stringent. Notably, under tort law a 
misrepresentation does not give rise to liability for fraudulent misrepresentation unless it is both 
fraudulent and material, while under contract law a misrepresentation may make a contract 
voidable if it is either.”). 
 241. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS § 4.1 (6th ed. 2009); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 
815 (1941). 
 242. As another example, the preexisting duty rule in contract law rejects modifications which 
lack independent consideration. See Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 
(1891); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (AM LAW INST. 1981). If a smart contract 
does specify the opportunity for mutual modification, it need not incorporate a consideration 
requirement when doing so.  
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breach, and not to generate ex ante obligations.243 If the point of 
contract were to enforce promises, or to allow parties to advert to 
liability voluntarily, contract law ought to allow them to make binding 
gift promises. But from its ex post vantage point, contract law can 
distinguish unenforceable gifts and mutual legal obligations. By 
contrast, smart contracts load all the effort into the ex ante 
specification of contractual terms. 
3. Problems with Capacity.  The issues with legal capacity are 
somewhat different. Here, the question is not what the contract 
includes, but who it binds. Those without legal capacity, including 
children, people with significant mental impairments, and the 
excessively intoxicated, are excused from contractual performance.244 
As with consideration, smart contracts have no means to test for 
capacity. There is no legal limitation on minors having private 
encryption keys or owning Bitcoins, as they are currently restricted 
from having credit cards or accounts on payment services like 
PayPal.245 And if someone digitally signs a smart contract while dead 
drunk, or another person exploits those circumstances to get them that 
person do so, there is no future opportunity for subjective evaluation 
by the other party. 
The absence of a capacity test raises a deeper set of issues for 
smart contracts. The parties to a smart contract, at a technical level, are 
not people. They are cryptographic private keys. The secret private key 
represents the individual, based on a mathematical relationship with 
the associated public key. It is virtually impossible for someone who 
does not possess the private key to generate a valid digital signature 
that matches a given public key. This allows cryptographic keys to form 
the basis for digital identity systems.246 Identity, however, is a rich 
 
 243. See supra Part III.C. 
 244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). As with 
meeting of the minds, this is an objective test. See id. § 12(1) (“Capacity to contract may be partial 
and its existence in respect of a particular transaction may depend upon the nature of the 
transaction or upon other circumstances.”). 
 245. See Sean Williams, Americans’ Average Credit Score Is Rising—How Does Yours 
Compare?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/americans-average-
credit-score-rising-527641 [https://perma.cc/3AVE-HBEU] (noting that the CARD Act of 2009 
prohibited those under 21 from obtaining credit cards without a parent cosigning or evidence of 
sufficient income to pay debts); PAYPAL, USER AGREEMENT FOR PAYPAL SERVICES § 1.2, 
https://www.paypal.com/ga/webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full [https://perma.cc/75M2-
GGXN] (“To be eligible to use the PayPal Services, you must be at least 18 years old . . . .”). 
 246. See L. Jean Camp, Digital Identity, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y, Fall 2004, at 34, 40. 
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concept, and requires layering various capabilities for authentication, 
access, and more.247 Moreover, even if a key uniquely belongs to an 
individual, the person and the key are not the same. An individual may 
possess many digital identities, backed by different private keys. The 
key may be linked to personally identifiable information that points to 
the specific individual. On the other hand, the key may designate a 
persistent digital identity hiding the associated real-world person, 
“pseudonymity,” or, it may give no information at all about identity, 
“anonymity.” 
It may not be right, then, to say that smart contracts are 
agreements between people. In the case of the computable or data-
oriented contract, the negotiation and specification of an agreement 
may be left entirely to machines.248 But there, it is generally easy to 
view the computers as agents for their human programmers, who 
specify the conditions under which the computers can contract. The 
relevant practical difficulties, are not so different from those which 
agency law has addressed for centuries. With a smart contract, 
however, the connection between the humans and the agreement 
becomes more attenuated. The power of execution and enforcement is 
given over entirely to machines. The humans no longer have the 
capacity, in the colloquial sense, to avoid performance of the 
agreement. Perhaps they likewise do not have the capacity, in the legal 
sense, to perform it. 
This analysis connects with the conclusion above that smart 
contracts are not promises, even if they are contracts.249 That may be 
easy to accept conceptually, but as the foregoing discussion shows, 
things start to unravel when viewed doctrinally. Law bakes in 
assumptions about the human nature of contract. It may not be difficult 
as a thought experiment to imagine a contract that does not meet 
contract law’s doctrinal specifications. However, once one dives into 
the analytical problems of contract law, the difficulties quickly 
multiply. This illustrates why smart contracts could not supplant 
contract law. 
4. Problems with Legality.  Perhaps tautologically, a legally 
enforceable contract cannot effectuate an illegal purpose. Smart 
contracts, however, are not enforced by the legal system. Imagine, for 
 
 247. See id. 
 248. See supra Part I.A. 
 249. See supra Part II.A. 
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example, a price-fixing conspiracy implemented through a series of 
smart contracts that adjust prices in lockstep.250 The participants could 
be prosecuted under antitrust law, but the smart contracts would 
continue to operate. Further, there is no mechanism to stop a smart 
contract from implementing an unconscionable term, or a term that 
incorporates liquidated damages amounting to a penalty. Because the 
smart contract is self-executing, an action in court finding the terms 
unenforceable may have no practical effect; the contract will be 
performed regardless. 
The legality test and various public policy rules hint that contract, 
generally considered a bastion of private law, retains a penumbra of 
public law. Again, this reinforces the view that contract law is an 
adjudicative mechanism, and is not principally concerned with reasons 
and obligations.251 Legal adjudication is a public function, drawing on 
the coercive power of the state. Individuals acting together may have 
no problem effectuating a scheme in derogation of public policy, but as 
Thomas Hobbes argued, the state is granted an extraordinary 
monopoly on violence for the very purpose of preventing the war of all 
against all.252 
These arguments of political theorists imagining a hypothetical 
state of nature become tangible with smart contracts. The hacking of 
The DAO illustrated the problem with contracts that have no 
opportunity for public oversight.253 The hack was simultaneously valid 
as an enforceable smart contract within the software system, yet 
demonstrably invalid as theft in the minds of the contracting parties. If 
the perpetrator had exploited a bug in a conventional crowdfunding 
service such as Kickstarter to siphon off investors’ funds, there would 
be no practical or legal difficulty in canceling the suspect transactions 
and returning the funds. Ethereum, in contrast, had no alternative to 
the nuclear option of the hard fork. While that may have fixed the 
immediate problem, the solution used a bazooka to shoot a mouse and 
caused significant collateral damage. 
Even if a hard fork is effective, it transfers final adjudication from 
the institution of the courts to the polity of validation nodes.254 A hard 
 
 250. This scenario of an algorithmic conspiracy has in fact been suggested by competition law 
experts. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION 47–52 (2016). 
 251. See supra Part III. 
 252. See HOBBES, supra note 6. 
 253. See Popper, supra note 172. 
 254. Even if a court wished to halt execution of a smart contract such as the one through which 
funds were stolen from The DAO, there would not necessarily be any party to enjoin. See supra 
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fork stands or falls on whether a majority of the mining power in the 
blockchain network adopts it. This is not how contracts work. We do 
not adjudicate disputes through opinion polls or the ballot box. We 
grant the judge or jury authority to decide, constrained by the 
procedures of the legal system, the traditions of the common law, and 
the opportunity for legislative modification going forward. The 
limitations of direct democracy are familiar to anyone who has read the 
Federalist Papers.255 Miners’ interests may be even further removed 
from those of the community as a whole than “factions” in a 
democracy. 
This is not to say that smart contracts are a threat to democratic 
values. One can imagine many scenarios in a world where smart 
contracts are prevalent, but legal analysis cannot rest entirely on 
imagined scenarios. We have no way of knowing how popular smart 
contracts will become, let alone how frequently controversies like The 
DAO hack will arise. What matters is that the seemingly abstract 
conflicts between smart contracts and basic doctrines of contract law 
touch deeper nerves, with potentially significant consequences. And, 
as in Part III, we investigate smart contracts for what they illuminate 
about conventional contracts. 
C. Looking Forward 
Having established that smart contracts both clarify the purpose 
of contract law in theory and challenge its application in practice, we 
conclude with a sketch about what happens next. Any 
recommendations at this time are necessarily provisional. Smart 
contracts are so new, and their prospects are so uncertain, that firm 
predictions are unwise, let alone normative judgments from those 
predictions. However, that is no reason to ignore potential 
consequences while there is still time to avoid them. And given the 
various considerations we have discussed, it is unreasonable to assume 
smart contracts will be implemented seamlessly. 
1. Best Practices.  The parties entering into smart contracts are not 
powerless to avoid their shortcomings. Knowing they cannot rely on 
the judicial decisionmakers to fill gaps, one can expect parties to put 
more effort into contract design and drafting.256 Additionally, just as 
 
note 96 and accompanying text.  
 255. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 256. See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and 
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transactional lawyers provide expertise in the construction of business 
agreements, a new class of “legal engineers” may arise to aid in the 
creation of smart contracts.257 Parties can also employ technical 
mechanisms to lessen the rigidity of smart contracts. For example, 
giving authority to human oracles who decide whether the factual basis 
for performance has been met,258 or employing arbitrators who resolve 
disputes through a multisig arrangements,259 may avoid some of the 
draconian implications of fully self-enforcing agreements. 
Already, organizations involved in the development of smart 
contract platforms are starting to create templates that embody best 
practices for smart contract drafting.260 Using these templates, parties 
could avoid repeating mistakes in prior smart contracts, and they could 
draw on the expertise of industry groups carefully thinking about 
potential pitfalls. Smart contracting systems or, “contractware” to use 
Raskin’s term,261 could be programmed to offer templates 
automatically based on the desired agreement. Default terms, for 
example, requiring an opportunity for mutual modification prior to 
execution, could be mandatory to issue a smart contract on a particular 
platform. Parties could consult technical auditing firms to certify the 
integrity of smart contract code.262 Even if the platforms are not subject 
to any legal duties regarding the contracts they enable, they still may 
care about avoiding harmful outcomes due to either ignorance or 
malfeasance by parties. 
We cannot predict how well this optimistic story will play out. 
Surely, technical mechanisms for improving the quality of smart 
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 258. See supra note 118. 
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Corda Platform, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016 3:45 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/barclays-
smart-contract-templates-heralds-first-ever-public-demo-r3s-corda-platform-1555329 [https://
perma.cc/8JHG-45BY]. 
 261. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 307. 
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contracts will not eliminate the potential problems, any more than the 
ready availability of skilled lawyers prevents disputes over legal 
contracts. 
2. Restitution.  It would be a grave mistake to think that smart 
contracts will eliminate litigation. Litigation—like nature—will find a 
way. Parties will inevitably feel they were treated unfairly at times, and 
they will inevitably bring those complaints to court. The difference, 
however, will be the posture of the litigation. Rather than complaining 
parties seeking fulfillment of alleged promissory obligations, 
complaining parties will seek to undo or reverse completed 
transactions. Litigation will persist, but it will shift from claims of 
breach, to claims of restitution. 
One might think that this effectively shifts contracts from liability 
rules to property rules.263 That’s not quite right, because one could have 
a smart contract that awards liability damages in a self-executing way. 
Rather, the difference is between ex ante enforcement and ex post 
adjudication. We have tried to illustrate that it is a mistake to conceive 
of these as simply two different forms of “enforcement.”264 
An effort to recover already-transferred resources is different 
than an effort to enforce an agreement. Thus, an action for restitution 
is very different than an action for breach of contract. At a minimum, 
the roles of the parties are reversed. In an action for breach, the 
nonperforming party seeks to enforce a transaction; whereas, in an 
action for restitution, the performing party seeks to reverse the 
transaction. Reversing who stands as plaintiff shifts the burdens of 
proof and litigation. In situations such as mutual mistake, there may be 
no a priori reason to favor one side. But when actions arise from claims 
of fraud, repugnance to public policy, or gifts without consideration, 
the balance of equities may shift in undesirable ways. 
Those seeking redress for injuries suffered due to smart contracts 
may be forced to plead actions beyond quasi contract. To take an 
example highlighted earlier, both the plaintiff and the defendant can 
raise a claim of fraud, but the legal context is quite different. The 
plaintiff’s claim is a tort, the defendant’s claim is an affirmative defense 
in contract, and the legal requirements are different. Moreover, in 
 
 263. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972) (distinguishing 
property and liability rules). 
 264. See supra Part III. 
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practice, such litigation may unfold quite differently if the focus shifts 
from the contract to the technical structures associated with it.265 
Because the transfer of value associated with the smart contract is tied 
to the parties’ cryptographic private keys, the plaintiff may need to sue 
to force the defendant to give up that key, or perhaps computer 
passwords protecting it. Law enforcement agencies have done just that, 
when pursuing proprietors of Bitcoin exchanges promoting illegal 
activity like drug trafficking.266 If that is the model, however, we have 
strayed quite far from the private law domain of contract. 
3. Regulation.  Indeed, the paradoxical result of smart contracts 
may be to expand the scope of government intervention into 
technological advancements, which has traditionally been a 
paradigmatic environment of private ordering. Once again, the shift 
from ex post adjudication to ex ante enforcement creates an inversion. 
Contracts free individuals to trust each others’ commitments because 
they can rely on the power of the state to enforce them in cases of 
breach. Smart contracts remove the state from adjudication, but in so 
doing, they create pressure to reintroduce the state at the front end of 
the process. The only way to prevent smart contracts from facilitating 
illegal or disfavored conduct is to regulate them.267 
It is a myth that the blockchain is inherently incompatible with 
regulation.268 Any distributed ledger system may be more or less 
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85DX-XSY9]. Whether this waiver is enforceable is another question. 
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(Stuart Hoegner ed., 2015) (“A common misconception about Bitcoin is that it is not regulated.”); 
Jerry Brito, Bitcoin Remains a Tool for Freedom, Even While Going Mainstream, REASON.COM 
WERBACH & CORNELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2017 11:58 AM 
378  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:313 
decentralized, and more or less anonymous, based on its technical 
design. Bitcoin and Ethereum are examples of “permissionless” 
systems that have no supervisory entity authorized to accept or reject 
participation in the mining network.269 Other smart contract platforms, 
such as the Corda system for interbank transactions, only recognize 
trusted nodes, such as member banks.270 This makes them less resistant 
to government intervention or private domination. A Corda smart 
contract could easily be subject to regulatory oversight, like the Anti-
Money Laundering and Know Your Customer regulations that 
mandate identification of bank customers.271 Even for a permissionless 
system, centralized intervention is not impossible; it is just very difficult 
and costly, as shown by the Ethereum hard fork to resolve The DAO 
hack.272 
Perhaps a more apt parallel is the regulation of digital signatures. 
With the rise of e-commerce in the 1990s, it quickly became clear that 
digital signatures based on public-key cryptography could solidify 
commitments in the same manner as conventional signatures on 
traditional contracts.273 A digital signature, however, is not really a 
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signature at all. It is a private key that generates an associated public 
key. Ultimately, the E-SIGN Act preempted contrary state law, and 
ensured that rules requiring signatures could be satisfied with their 
digital analogues.274 The legal effects and limitations of digital 
signatures were therefore not defined by handwriting specialists, but 
by government. 
Under many scenarios, regulators might interpose themselves into 
the workings of smart contracts. Generally speaking, these will involve 
regulation of the contracting software platforms or blockchain 
validation nodes, rather than the parties themselves. Someone 
knowingly entering into an illegal smart contract has still violated the 
law, but it will likely be easier to police the enabling systems.275 The 
kinds of smart contracts parties can form will depend on the 
functionality and interfaces of the available tools. This recalls the fate 
of P2P file-sharing systems like Napster, which facilitated widespread 
copyright infringement. The Supreme Court eventually concluded that 
even when P2P services had no specific knowledge of or ability to 
prevent infringing transfers, the services were still liable if set up to 
induce them.276 A smart contract system that facilitated copyright 
infringement, for example, by granting users digital rights to content 
without proper licenses, would likely suffer the same fate. 
As noted earlier, nothing technically prevents execution of an 
illegal smart contract.277 The infamous Silk Road online marketplace 
used Bitcoin payments to facilitate sales of illegal goods, but the 
transactions themselves used the same electronic contracting 
mechanisms as legitimate sites like Amazon.com or Ebay.278 If smart 
contracts can further automate such activities, or financial crimes like 
money laundering, there will be pressure to prohibit intermediaries 
from enabling or processing them. Moreover, legal requirements, like 
the automatic stay in bankruptcy law, can supersede contractual 
obligations. Courts and legislatures may attempt to require smart 
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contracting systems to incorporate exceptions for such contexts.279 
Administrative regulation of smart contracts is also a possibility. 
Various agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Board, have authority to prevent unfair or deceptive 
practices. This extends to situations where companies do not intend 
consumer harms, but fail to take sufficient precautions against them. 
For example, the FTC successfully brought an enforcement action 
against Wyndham Hotels for inadequate information security 
practices, which led to losses of customer data.280 One could imagine a 
similar action against the developers of The DAO, the Ethereum 
Foundation, or miners who processes its transactions, based on their 
failure to offer adequate safeguards for funds pledged to the 
crowdfunding system.281 It is difficult to evaluate what this would mean 
in practice. The Ethereum Foundation is a Swiss nonprofit, The DAO 
software is an open-source project, and the miners are a changing 
collection of voluntary participants around the world. Imposing 
regulatory obligations on any of them would be problematic. Yet if 
significant consumer harms materialize, regulators are unlikely to walk 
away. 
An analogous situation occurred in the early days of the 
commercial internet. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998282 
gave intermediaries immunity from liability for copyright 
infringement, but only if they complied with notice-and-takedown 
procedures when notified of infringing material.283 Congress or a state 
legislature concerned about smart contracts running amok might grant 
a safe harbor to software creators, application providers, and validation 
node operators, but condition that safe harbor on the adoption of 
templates, functional limitations, and audits for executable smart 
contracts. Such rules could be vague or overbroad, chilling the 
adoption of smart contracts, or they might provide security for parties 
who otherwise would be disinclined to use smart contracts. At this 
point, the specifics are too difficult to predict with any confidence. 
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To some degree, this is a familiar story. Where freedom of contract 
stands in the way of important public policy objectives, it must give 
ground. That occurred most famously when the New Deal eventually 
broke through the Lochner Court’s resistance to economic 
regulation.284 Smart contracting systems offer a kind of technical due 
process protection from legislative or judicial interference. While they 
may hold the state at bay to an extent, they will not eliminate it from 
the picture. 
CONCLUSION 
Our goal has been to analyze smart contracts from the perspective 
of law—and vice versa. Though there is significant evidence smart 
contracts will eventually enjoy widespread adoption, we make no 
assumptions about their technical and business trajectory. Even if 
smart contracts turn out to be a fad, they can help us better understand 
legal contracts. And if blockchain-based smart contracts fail, another 
technology will inevitably arise to achieve the same objectives. The 
very act of unpacking smart contracts may help to anticipate—and 
thus, to mitigate—potential difficulties. 
Smart contracts are just one part of the larger trend of 
computerized technologies purporting to displace or replace human 
decisionmaking.285 In areas like hiring, finance, and copyright 
enforcement, algorithmic systems are touted for their speed, efficiency, 
and reliability, unlike error-prone and potentially biased humans. 
Indeed, the benefits are considerable. But it quickly becomes clear that 
machines are prone to their own errors and biases.286 Additionally, the 
introduction of algorithmic systems into historically judgment-laden 
fields creates challenges for legal and practical accountability.287 As a 
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result, both legal scholars and computer scientists are developing 
techniques to promote fairness and transparency in these decisions.288 
A similar dynamic can be expected for smart contracts. 
Contract law is nothing if not resilient. We have little doubt it will 
survive the onslaught from smart contracts, if indeed that is what is 
happening. However, contract law may learn something about itself 
from its new challenger. 
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